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Abstract
The main objective of this study is to develop a risk model for Shariah (Islamic) compli-
ant investment and insurance. Islamic finance is a part of Socially Responsible Investment
(SRI) that incorporates religious ethics. In the first part, we propose a portfolio opti-
mization model that complies with Shariah rules. Motivated by the Markowitz’s mean
variance model, this study proposes a new portfolio optimization model that takes into
consideration both processes of purification and screening, which are key to constructing
a Shariah-compliant portfolio. The model reflects the stochastic nature of purification
and applies to both investment and dividend purification. Recognizing the importance of
on-going screening and that assets that subsequently become non-compliance during the
investment horizon could adversely affect the portfolio strategy, we impose probabilistic
constraints to control the risk of compliance change. We conduct an extensive empirical
study using a sample of Shariah-compliant public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange. We evaluate our proposed model by formulating the probabilistic constraints at
both asset and portfolio levels, together with three different financial screening divisors that
are broadly used by the international Shariah boards. The empirical results demonstrate
that the effect of imposing non-compliance probabilistic constraints is highly sensitive to
the adopted divisors and that these constraints can be an effective way of mitigating the
risk of compliance change, thereby avoiding involuntary asset liquidation, and enhancing
the performance of the resulting Shariah-compliant portfolio.
We extend the Shariah portfolio model to the multiperiod problem consisting of a risk-
free asset and risky assets in the second part of this thesis. We assume geometric Brownian
motion to capture the dynamic of purified asset return, and we apply two assumptions for
the dynamic of the screening financial ratio. In the first one, we assume that the finan-
cial ratios are independent and follow beta distributions. The second assumption relaxes
the independence assumption by allowing the financial ratios to follow the Beta-AR(p,q)
model. We also take into account other Shariah constraints, namely no-short selling and
no-leverage restrictions. We solve the multiperiod mean-variance Shariah portfolio problem
using a pre-commitment approach and adopt the multi-stage strategy following by Stochas-
tic Grid Bundling Method (SGBM) to find the optimal asset allocations. Finally, we apply
the proposed algorithm to generate Shariah portfolio efficient frontiers for multiperiod time
cases to see the impact of each Shariah variable on the performance of the portfolio. The
empirical simulations show that the proposed probabilistic Shariah screening constraint is
efficient in maintaining the sustainability of the asset in the portfolio.
In the third part of this study, we construct a new risk model representing the Hybrid-
Takaful (Islamic Insurance) framework and develop a computational procedure to calculate
v
the associated ruin probability. The Hybrid-Takaful business model applies a Wakalah
(agent-based) contract for underwriting activities and Mudharabah (profit sharing) con-
tracts for investment activities. We consider the existence of the qard-hasan facility pro-
vided by the operator (shareholder) as a benevolent loan for participants’ fund in case of
a deficit. This facility is a no-interest loan that will be repaid if the business generates
profit in the future. For better investment management, we propose a separate investment
account of participants’ fund. We implement several numerical examples to analyze the
impact of several parameters on the Takaful business model. We also find that our pro-
posed Takaful model has a better performance compare with the conventional counterpart
in terms of the probability of ruin. At the end of this thesis, we describe the conclusions
and possible future research topic for each component of this thesis.
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Islamic (Shariah) finance is the only financial system in the world today that is based on the
teaching of a dominant religion (Hassan and Mahlknecht, 2011). The practice of Islamic
finance follows the principles of the Quran, Holy Book of Islam, the Hadith, which are
the teachings and sayings of Prophet Muhammad, and Ijtihad, comprising scholarly legal
deductions.Two fundamental principles in Islamic finance are the prohibition of interest
and the rejection of financial speculation with the noble purpose of social justice. However,
religion is not a prerequisite for the participation in Islamic finance. In fact, the Islamic
finance are surfacing not just among Muslim countries, but also in Australia and other
western countries. In particular the report by Trowers and Hamlins (2019) indicates that
the UK is the top western centre for Islamic finance. Based on the GIFR (2019) report, the
Islamic finance industry has a positive annual growth of 6.58% during 2018 with total asset
USD 2.6 trillion at the end of 2018 in across 75 countries from its three main sectors namely:
Islamic banking, Shariah capital market, and Islamic insurance (Takaful). According to
the ICD (2019) report, the global Islamic assets are projected to increase to US$ 3.472
trillion by 2024.
In recent years the concept of the Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has received
much attention among private and institutional investors. To construct a SRI portfolio,
the investors do not just rely on the optimal tradeoff between risk and reward, as dictated
by the modern portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952), but they also take into considerations
other factors, depending on the definition of being “socially responsible”. For example,
an environment activist concerned with climate change will be excluding carbon intensive
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companies, such as coal mining companies, from their investment portfolio. The Shariah-
compliant investment is another class of SRI, which complies with the principles of Shariah
(Islamic rule).
Shariah-compliant investment implies that the investment strategy must adhere to the
following four Shariah principles (see Abbes, 2017): (i) Haram Income (prohibit to invest in
business that is unlawful from the perspective of Islam); (ii) Riba (prohibit to earn interest
on lending); (iii) Maysir (must avoid speculative or unnecessary risk); and (iv) Gharar
(prohibit to take excessive risk that might lead to loss). From a portfolio construction
point of view, ensuring a portfolio that complies with the Shariah principles is equivalent
to imposing additional constraints on the portfolio construction. Therefore, a Shariah-
compliant investment is more restrictive and with a smaller feasible set of investable assets.
For these reasons, there is a cost to the compliance, as typically reflected in lower expected
return. For example, the studies conducted by Gasser et al. (2017) conclude a statistically
significant decrease in expected returns for SRI. See also Nainggolan et al. (2015).
In practice, most Shariah boards agree that a portfolio that adheres to Shariah requires
two processes, known as the screening process and the purification process. The screening
process ensures that assets in the portfolio remain in compliance throughout the entire
investment horizon. It involves pre-screening and on-going monitoring, which can be qual-
itative or quantitative (see Chapter 2.1.1). The purification process recognizes that, in
today’s complex business environment, it may be difficult to find a company that is 100%
compliant with Shariah principles. For examples, part of a hotel’s revenue may be from
serving alcohol or part of a company’s revenue may be attributed to interest income from
the cash investment. These activities are considered non-halal and the resulting income is
classified as non-permissible income. However, Islamic investors are still allowed to invest
in these companies as long as these activities do not exceed a certain threshold and that
the non-permissible income is “treated” appropriately. The act of cleansing and deducting
the non-permissible income from the investors’ returns is known as the purification process
(Marzban, 2011; Elgari, 2000; Gamaleldin, 2015). As to be explained in Chapter 2.1.2, the
method of purification can be based on dividend or investment.
Because of these complications, some extensions of Markowitz (1952) have been pro-
posed recently for constructing a Shariah-compliant portfolio. Hazny et al. (2012) review
Markowtiz’s mean-variance model and conclude that most of the assumptions are con-
sistent with Shariah. Derbali et al. (2017) and Hazny et al. (2020) extend one period
Markowtiz’s model by imposing short-selling constraint, a constant purification rate and
zakat rate. Loosely speaking, zakat can be interpreted as a form of religious tax with
value typically set at 2.5%. The Islamic investors are expected to pay zakat from their
investment gains as a way of giving back to the society. By interpreting zakat as a form
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of purification, Masri (2017) incorporates zakat and obtains a Shariah-compliant portfolio
via a goal programming method involving chance-constrained and a recourse approach.
The aforementioned literature represents some earlier attempts to construct a Shariah-
compliant portfolio. Derigs and Marzban (2008) show that different opinions and incon-
sistencies exist among the Shariah scholars and their compliance strategies. While some
approaches (such as Masri, 2017) do not make distinction between zakat and purifica-
tion, Marzban (2011) argue that this practice is inconsistent with Sharia as it is based
on different concept and that the investors cannot use the non-permissible income from
their investment to pay for zakat. The assumption of a constant purification rate made
in Derbali et al. (2017) may not be reasonable due to the volatility of the business ac-
tivities and returns. A more serious limitation is that the existing literature appears to
have focused only on asset pre-screening and overlooked the importance of the on-going
screening. A portfolio manager may implement an investment strategy based on an initial
set of Shariah-compliant assets. As time evolves, however, some of these assets may no
longer be Shariah compliant. When this occurs, the non-compliant asset(s) will need to
be liquidated and the portfolio will need to be re-balanced to maintain Shariah compli-
ance. The involuntary liquidation may adversely distort the performance of the adopted
investment strategy, and hence it is prudent to integrate the risk of non-compliance to the
investment decision making.
Besides investment, insurance is an integral part of the financial plan as efforts to
keep away from potential adversities whenever such things occur. However, most Islamic
scholars agree that conventional insurance is not acceptable under Shariah (Islamic law)
its interpretation with respect to some means and methods that are related to Gharar
(uncertainty), Maisir (gambling), and Riba (interest-bearing) (Husain and Pasha, 2011).
Takaful is an alternative innovative instrument that provides similar protection as the
conventional insurance except that it complies with Shariah law. The word Takaful is
from Arabic that means to take care of one’s need (Yusof et al., 2011). General (non-
life) Takaful was firstly established in 1979 while family (life) Takaful was introduced later
in 1984 (Kassim et al., 2013). The Takaful industry is still growing at the rate of 19%
in 2018, with total assets USD 46 billion from 324 Takaful operators in 47 countries,
according to the IFDR (2018) report. Moreover, it is anticipated the Takaful will continue
to grow, especially in the Muslim countries community. For example, in Indonesia, with
98% Muslim population, the Indonesian Health Social Security Organising Agency (BPJS)
and the Employment Social Insurance Administration Organisation (BPJS Employment)
are currently developing Shariah-based products to attract Muslim citizens (Bappenas,
2018).
The main difference between Takaful and commercial insurance lies in the contract
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design. In conventional insurance, the insurance company sells the contract with a promise
to pay for the loss to the policyholder. However, this practice is forbidden in Islam, as
it is not clear what is sold under the insurance product. The Takaful contract combines
agency and profit/risk sharing in their business, instead. The role of Takaful companies is to
manage the Takaful fund only, while the liability of any claims is borne by the Takaful fund,
which is owned by Takaful participants. This contract’s feature make Takaful quite similar
to mutual insurance. However, the main difference is in the existence of the operator in
Takaful insurance. In addition, to manage the Takaful business, the operator also provides
capital. Hence, Takaful operator has some rights to a part of surplus from Takaful fund.
Similar to the conventional counterpart, in terms of protection, there are two types
of Takaful business model, namely: general (non-life) Takaful and family (life) Takaful.
Based on business models, the operation of Takaful can be structured as Wakalah (agent-
based contract), Mudarabah (profit sharing), Hybrid (mixed), and Waqf model. Under the
Wakalah (agency) contract, the role of Takaful operator is a wakeel (agent) that is paid
by participants a predefined fee to manage the Takaful funds. The Wakalah fee is paid in
advance as a percentage of contribution. After deducting the wakalah fee, the rest of the
contributions are credited to the participants’ funds, which are also called Tabaru funds. In
the Mudarabah (profit sharing) contract, the operator and the participants should agree
on a profit-sharing rate at the commencement of the contract. Under this contract, all
participants’ contribution is credited to Takaful fund without any deduction. A Hybrid
contract applies the Wakalah contract for underwriting activities, while Mudarabah is
adopted for investment activities. The latter model is the most dominant in the Takaful
market (Tolefat and Asutay, 2013).
The growing trend of the Takaful market requires in-depth studies of its financial stabil-
ity and actuarial modeling to make a better business decision. Ruin theory is fundamental
study in actuarial science that analyses the dynamic evolution of the capital of insurance
products driven by different sources of risk. One important problem in ruin theory is the
estimation of the probability that surplus becomes negative at some point in the future, or
often described as the ruin probability problem. A brief overview of some current research
on ruin probability can be found in (Bulinskaya, 2017). Because Takaful products have
different features when compared with its conventional counterpart, the two products have
different types of risk leading to different risk models. However, until now there are no
studies on risk for Takaful itself. This study contributes to the development of Takaful risk
model.
In this study, we focus on the development of finite-time ruin probability for Takaful
business, especially for a Hybrid model. In practice, this topic is helpful for Enterprise
Risk Management to study the probability of becoming insolvent before 5 or 10 years in a
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steady regime, which can be used to assess whether the activity is sustainable in a steady
regime (Gerber and Loisel, 2012). We incorporate qard-hasan facility (benevolent loan) in
our Hybrid Takaful risk model (see Chapter 4.1), which is an essential element to maintain
Takaful solvency requirement (Onagun, 2011; Rahim et al., 2017). The practical example
of the qard-hasan facility is the situation where the Indonesian government may provide a
qard-hasan facility through Baznas (Indonesia’s national Zakat collection agency) to over-
come the deficit of the Shariah-based products as a strategy to achieve the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) in Indonesia (Rehman, 2019). We present numerical simu-
lations based on the constructed finite-time ruin probability to investigate the impact of
some variables on the performance of Takaful business. Based on our numerical results, we
find that some conditions under which the Takaful product is not only in line with Shariah
rule but may also outperforms the conventional counterpart. This result answers the key
concern related to the optimal structure of the Takaful model mentioned in the WTR
(2016) report. According to this report, many shareholders expect to see profitability in
line with conventional insurers, while participants expect to see a unique product that fully
embraces the ideals principal of Takaful.
1.2 Research Objective
In this work, we study and proposed some mathematical models that comply with the
Shariah rule for Islamic compliant portfolios and Takaful insurance.
First, we propose a variant of the Markowitz-based Shariah-compliant model with the
following two distinctive features. The first feature assumes that the purification rates
(both dividend and investment) are stochastic, hence relaxing the assumption of of Der-
bali et al. (2017) and Hazny et al. (2020). The second feature introduces probabilistic
constraints to explicitly control the risk of non-compliance and to integrate them to the
portfolio strategy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly
considers the non-compliance risk in the construction of Shariah-compliant portfolio.
Second, we extend the one-period Shariah problem to the multiperiod problem. Unlike
conventional finance, the discussion of the multiperiod portfolio problem has never been
mentioned before in Islamic finance. We incorporate the proposed purification and screen-
ing constraints in the multiperiod problem. We also integrate the existing risk-free asset
in the Shariah portfolio and impose the leverage restriction on the portfolio. Finally, we
follow the idea of Cong and Oosterlee (2016) to use the pre-commitment strategy and apply
Stochastic Grid Bundling Method (SGBM) to solve the multiperiod portfolio problem.
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Third, we propose a Takaful risk model that incorporates investment activities and
qard-hasan (benevolent loan) facility, and derive a finite-time ruin probability formula to
quantify the risk associated with Hybrid Takaful. We follow the idea of Kim and Drekic
(2016) to construct a recursive formula to calculate ruin probability. We enhance the model
by allowing an investment option with stochastic returns.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses the proposed mathematical model for a Shariah compliant portfolio
problem. We start the discussion from the practice of investment portfolio in Islamic capital
market in Chapter 2.1. Following the construction of Markowitz-based Shariah compliant
model in Chapter 2.2. Our extensive empirical studies, where we examine different type
of purification methods and different quantitative screening methods involving different
commonly adopted divisors, validate the importance of incorporating the non-compliance
probabilistic constraints to the Markowitz-based Shariah-compliant model. See Chapter 2.3
for data and parameter estimations and Chapter 2.4 for the empirical analysis.
Chapter 3 provides the extension of the Shariah-compliant portfolio optimization prob-
lem with the purification and screening process for a multiperiod case. First, we construct
the multiperiod Shariah portfolio problem and introduce several Shariah constraints in
Chapter 3.1. Then, we explain the proposed method to solve the constructed Shariah
problem in Chapter 3.2. Finally, Chapter 3.3 presents some numerical simulations to il-
lustrate the impact of purification and screening on the optimal asset allocations and the
portfolio performance.
Chapter 4 presents the formulation of Takaful risk model and the associated finite-
time ruin probability. First we explain the practice of Hybrid Takaful and the definition
of qard-hasan facility in Chapter 4.1. In Chapter 4.2, we introduce the surplus model
and the associated mathematical variables. While the construction of the finite-time ruin
probability is explained in Chapter 4.3. Chapter 4.4 presents some results of our numerical
simulations.
Chapter 5 describes the conclusions and possible future research topic for each compo-
nent of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
A Single Period Markowitz-based
Shariah Compliant Portfolio Model
This chapter provides the construction of the Shariah portfolio model in one period time
setting with the following key contributions to the existing literature:
• We introduce two types of purification into the Shariah portfolio optimization prob-
lem: dividend and investment purification. We construct the purification model based
on the current practice of the purification process in the Shariah capital market. We
find that our proposed model is more realistic than the existing model proposed by
Hazny et al. (2020) and Derbali et al. (2017).
• We propose non-compliance probabilistic constraints into the Shariah portfolio model.
The current literature in the Shariah portfolio only considers a static screening pro-
cess. However, in practice, the screening process is carried out throughout the in-
vestment period. Therefore, the probabilistic constraints are essential to maintain
the sustainability compliance status of the portfolio.
• We study the sensitivity of several important variables to the performance of the
Shariah portfolio. The study includes the impact of two types of purification, short




This section explains in greater detail two prominent processes in constructing Shariah-
complaint portfolio, namely screening process and purification process.
2.1.1 Screening process
The screening process consists of two phases. The first screening phase relates to the
pre-screening “portfolio selection” and the second screening phase involves the on-going
monitoring. Let us focus on the first screening phase. While the screening criteria could
vary from investor to investor, some plausible criteria include the types of securities (e.g.
bonds versus stocks), sector consideration (e.g. high-tech stocks vs utilities stocks), secu-
rities’ risk and return characteristics, etc. In addition to these screening considerations,
a Shariah-compliant portfolio has the added constraint that the securities in the portfolio
must adhere to Shariah. In practice, Islamic investors may have a Shariah board that pre-
scribes the Islamic capital market’s rule and issues a list of Shariah-compliant stocks. An
example of Shariah board is the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Finan-
cial Institutions (AAOIFI) for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) clients. Shariah advisory
council for Malaysian investors, and National Shariah board of Indonesian Ulema Council
(DSN-MUI) for Indonesian investors.
The Shariah-compliant screening criteria, can be classified as either qualitative or quan-
titative. Qualitative screening examines the nature of the business and excludes stocks of
companies with activities that are in direct conflict with Shariah. For example, conven-
tional banks, insurance companies, and companies with dealings in pork, liquor, drugs,
and weapons are excluded. Companies that pass the qualitative screening are then pro-
ceeded to quantitative screening, where some selected financial ratios are calculated and
companies that exceed some preset thresholds are removed. Based on the notations defined
in Table 2.1, below we list four commonly adopted quantitative financial screening ratios.
For more information on the use of these ratios for quantitative screening, see Gamaleldin
(2015).
1. Leverage Ratio = TID
TA or MC24 or MC36
;
2. Cash Ratio = TC+IBS
TA or MC24 or MC36
;
3. Liquidity Ratio = AR+TC
TA or MC24 or MC36
;
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Notation Definition Notation Definition
AR : Account receivables TA : Total assets
IBS : Interest-bearing securities TC : Total cash
MC24 : 24-month market capitalization TID : Total Interest-bearing debt
MC36 : 24-month market capitalization TR : Total revenue
NPI : Non-permissible income
The screening criteria based on Leverage Ratio and Cash Ratio are meant to restrict
company’s investment activities on riba, which is considered non-halal. Most Shariah
boards use either 33% or 1/3 as the maximum threshold for these two ratios. A company
with higher liquidity, in general, reflects positive financial condition, although this is not
necessarily the case from the Shariah perspective. According to the Shariah’s principle,
returns should be gained from the illiquid assets only (Derigs and Marzban, 2008). For
this reason, Shariah boards impose the liquidity screening condition with its ratio ranging
from 33% to 55%. The final screening NPI Ratio recognizes that it may be difficult to find
a company that is truly Shariah compliant. As long as the company’s NPI Ratio is no
more than, say 5%, the company is still deemed as Shariah-compliant.
Table 2.2 summarizes the quantitative screening financial ratios for Indonesian Shariah
board (ISB) and four other Islamic indices, namely S&P Shariah Index, Dow Jones Islamic
Market Index (DJIM), FTSE Shariah global equity Index series, and MSCI Islamic Index.
Note that the screening thresholds and the divisors could vary depending on the index,
hence demonstrating that there is no (strict) consensus among the Shariah boards.
Table 2.2: Quantitative Shariah-Compliant Financial Ratios.
Compliance Cash Ratio Leverage Ratio Liquidity Ratio NPI Ratio
ISB TID
TA








































Implementing the above qualitative and quantitative screening processes enables the
Shariah board to produce a list of securities that complies with Shariah principles. This
list, in turn, becomes a universe of feasible securities for the portfolio manager and in-
vestors to construct a Shariah-compliant portfolio. Once a Shariah-compliant portfolio is
constructed after the above pre-screening process, it requires an on-going monitoring, and
this corresponds to the second screening phase. The on-going monitoring is important as
the quantitative screening financial ratios may fluctuate over the investment horizon due
to business and market volatilities. Consequently, a security that is initially compliant may
subsequently become non-compliant. When this occurs, the non-compliant security will
need to be liquidated and the portfolio will need to be rebalanced to ensure compliance.
The involuntary liquidation can be devastating to the investment return, thus highlight-
ing the critical role of the on-going screening process. It is, therefore, prudent to select
securities that minimize the risk of compliance change throughout the investment horizon.
This key insight motivates our proposed Shariah-compliant portfolio model, where we
explicitly impose probabilistic constraints in order to control the risk of compliance change
(see Subsection 2.2.3). In addition to the better investment perspective, this probabilistic
constraint is also an important tool to maintain the sustainable Shariah compliance. As
some Islamic investors want to invest their fund in a company that is conventionally compli-
ant over time and not accidentally compliant over the current time period only (Marzban,
2008).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that explicitly considers the risk of
non-compliance. To conclude this subsection, we note that the non-compliance screening
process should be conducted continuously. While this is possible in theory, we assume that
in practice the on-going monitoring is only conducted at the end of the investment horizon.
2.1.2 Purification process
The imposed thresholds on the financial screening ratios ensure that the NPI is kept at
an acceptable level. The Islamic investors, however, are not allowed to accept any of the
NPI. For this reason, the portion corresponding to the NPI needs to be removed from
the earnings, and the act of cleansing and deducting the NPI from the investors’ returns
is known as the purification process (Marzban, 2011). There are two commonly adopted
practices for purifying a portfolio, namely dividend and investment purifications. The
dividend purification assumes that the dividend is a consequence of a company’s business
activities, and if part of the business activity is contaminated by non Shariah-compliant
activities, then the portfolio’s returns need to be cleansed. Hence the dividend received
will be reduced by the percentage of the NPI.
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While the dividend purification is widely accepted by most Shariah boards, including
those of FTSE and S&P, Marzban (2011) raises some concerns. The author argues that
the dividend purification is appropriate only if the company distributes all earnings in the
form of dividend. In practice there are companies that tend not to distribute dividend but
rather retain the earnings and reinvest in the companies for more growth opportunities.
For these companies, dividend purification would result in zero deduction, even though
part of the earnings may be non-halal. The investment purification rectifies this issue by
deducting the NPI proportionally according to the number of shares owned by the investors
relative to the outstanding shares of the company. This method is used in the GCC Shariah
market.
Let psi be the purification loss per share for asset i and purification method s for a
given investment, where we use s = 1 for dividend purification and s = 2 for investment





× Dividend per share, for s = 1, i = 1, ..., N
NPI including interest
Total outstanding shares
, for s = 2, i = 1, ..., N.
(2.1)
These information are readily available from the company’s financial statement. For ex-
ample, the non-permissible income data is typically obtained from the reported interest
income. Multiplying psi by the number of shares owned by the investors becomes the purifi-
cation loss for asset i. This will be the amount to be deducted from the investors’ portfolio.
Because of the purification process, the net return of the investors will be reduced by the
magnitude of the purification loss. Hence, it is important for the investors to take this
deduction into consideration when constructing a Shariah-complaint portfolio.
2.2 The proposed approach to Shariah-compliant port-
folio
Subsection 2.2.1 first reviews the conventional mean-variance portfolio model of Markowitz
(1952). Subsection 2.2.2 then discusses ways of incorporating purification process in con-
structing an investment portfolio. Finally, Subsection 2.2.3 formulates our proposed gener-
alization of Markowitz model that incorporates both purification and screening processes.
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2.2.1 Conventional Markowitz (1952) model
We begin by assuming that a portfolio manager is interested in constructing a Shariah-
compliant portfolio from a feasible set of N risky assets that have passed the pre-screening.
We assume that the current time is 0 and that the portfolio manager plans to hold the
investment for T years, which could be a day, a month, etc.
Let R = (R1, R2, . . . , RN)
′ be the vector of total return random variables, with Ri, i =
1, . . . N, representing the total return for asset i over the given investment horizon. By
investing in these assets, the total investment return could arise from the assets’ capital
appreciations and/or dividends. To distinguish these two returns, we introduce the follow-
ing two vectors RC = (RC1 , . . . , R
C
N)
′ and RD = (RD1 , . . . , R
D
N)
′ where RCi and R
D
i denote,
respectively, the (stochastic) capital appreciation rate and the (stochastic) dividend yield




i . We also define
µ = (µ1, . . . , µN)
′, µC = (µC1 , . . . , µ
C
N)




Σ = (σij)i,j=1,...,N , Σ
C = (σCij)i,j=1,...,N , Σ
D = (σDij )i,j=1,...,N ,



















j ), for i, j = 1, . . . , N.
Suppose a portfolio is constructed with portfolio weight x = (x1, . . . , xN)
′, where xi
denotes the percentage of the portfolio’s total investment amount invested in the i-th asset,
which implies that
∑N
i=1 xi = 1. Then for any portfolio strategy x, the portfolio rate of












The reward (portfolio expected return) and the riskiness (portfolio standard deviation or
variance) of the investment strategy associated with x can be computed, respectively, as
µx = E[Rx] = µ
′x, (2.3)
and
σ2x = Var(Rx) = x
′Σx. (2.4)




σ2x, subject to x
′e = 1 and µx = µ̂, (2.5)
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where e = (1, . . . , 1)′ is a N -dimensional vector of ones and µ̂ is a given level of expected
return. By solving the above optimization problem for all feasible values of µ̂, we can
construct the classical ”mean-variance efficient frontier” depicting the best possible trade-
off pairs of risk and reward.
2.2.2 Incorporating purification
In this section, we focus on integrating the purification process with the conventional
Markowitz model.
Definition 1. Let P s = (P s1 , . . . , P
s
N)
′ denote a vector of purification rates, with P si rep-
resenting the purification rate for asset i and purification method s. The purification rate





where psi is the purification amount for each share of asset i based on the purification
method s as defined by Equation (2.1), and Si is the initial value of asset i, i = 1, . . . , N .
As seen at time 0, psi is a random variable, and so is P
s
i . Let ψ




the mean vector of P s, i.e. ψsi = E[P
s
i ], and Ψ
s = (Ψsij)i,j=1,...,N be the variance-covariance
matrix of P s.
Let us denote by Rsx the random rate of return of a Shariah-compliant portfolio with








i − P si ). (2.7)
Comparing with the conventional portfolio construction (i.e. Equation (2.2)), the compli-
cation of a Shariah-compliant portfolio is the presence of the purification rate P si . Setting






The variance representation (2.9) assumes that the capital appreciation rate is uncorre-
lated with the purification rate and that the dividend yield is possibly correlated with the
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purification rate. Based on (2.1), the loss due to dividend purification is a percentage of
the dividend itself. Hence, there should be a positive correlation between dividend and
dividend purification. We also assume that there is possibly a non-zero correlation be-
tween dividend and investment purification (see Timothy, 2012). Notice that the NPI is
a part of the company performance. The assumption that the capital appreciation rate
is not correlated with the purification rate is based on the study conducted by Mashoka
(2013), which shows that the relationship between earning from financial statement and
stock return for non-banking sector is weak.
A Markowitz-based Shariah-compliant portfolio is now readily constructed by solving
(2.5) with Rx replaced by R
s
x and with the added short-selling constraint (i.e. xi ≥ 0, i =
1, . . . , N), since it is prohibited in Shariah. We should mention that in the Markowitz-
based Shariah-compliant portfolio models proposed by Hazny et al. (2020) and Derbali
et al. (2017), the authors assume that for each asset the purification rate is constant.
The assumption of constant purification rate constitutes the main difference between these
approaches and our method. Since we do not make such an assumption, our approach to
the construction of mean-variance Shariah portfolio is more general that those proposed by
Hazny et al. (2020) and Derbali et al. (2017). To be more specific, in Hazny et al. (2020)
and Derbali et al. (2017), the authors modify the random rate of return Ri for asset i to
R̃i where R̃i = (1− ψ̃i)(1− ζ)Ri and ψ̃i is the pre-determined purification rate for asset i
and ζ is the zakat rate.
2.2.3 Incorporating purification and screening
In this subsection, we describe our proposed method to the selection of Shariah-compliant
portfolio. As alluded earlier, our proposed approach is motivated by the fact that any
initially constructed Shariah-compliant portfolio is subject to an on-going monitoring. If
at any future time any of the asset is no longer compliant, then the non-compliant asset will
be liquidated. The involuntary liquidation can have an adverse impact on the performance
of the investment. This suggests that when constructing a Shariah-compliant portfolio,
the portfolio manager should be mindful of the potential involuntary liquidation, and
therefore it will be prudent to keep this possibility as low as possible. This is exactly what
our proposed Shariah-compliant portfolio aims to achieve.
In Subsection 2.1.1, we have presented four quantitative screening financial ratios: lever-
age ratio, cash ratio, liquidity ratio, and non-permissible income ratio. In a practical
screening process, the definitions of the first three financial ratios depend on the choice of
the divisor, which could be either the total asset value, or the 24-month market capital-
ization, or the 36-month market capitalization. Hence it is important to distinguish which
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divisor is used when dealing with the first three ratios. Suppose the random variable F kji
represents, at the end of the investment horizon, asset i’s financial ratio j based on divisor
k, where i ∈ {1, . . . , N}; j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}; k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. When j = 4, we have F k4i = F4i.
Suppose also that Ukj denotes the threshold level for financial ratio j and divisor k. Note
that Uk4 = U4, and U
k
j is a known constant at time 0. Whenever the realized financial ratio
j (based on divisor k) at the end of the investment period exceeds the threshold Ukj , then
asset i is no longer compliant and will need to be liquidated. Therefore, it is prudent to
ensure that if asset i is a member of the Shariah-compliant portfolio, then the probabil-
ity Pr(F kji > U
k
j ) should be kept as small as possible to reduce the chance of involuntary
liquidation.
To control the probability of a compliance change, we use α ∈ (0, 1] to capture the
maximum acceptable probability that F kji exceeds U
k
j , i.e.
Pr(F kji ≤ Ukj ) > 1− α i = 1, .., N ; j = 1, .., 4. (2.10)
This probabilistic constraints can be incorporated into the Markowitz-based Shariah-compliant
portfolio so that when α is set to be a small value, say 0.01, the resulting Shariah-compliant
portfolio will have a small probability of facing involuntary liquidation.
In practice, implementing above probabilistic constraints can be a challenging problem
as there are 4×N constraints. It is, therefore, useful to re-formulate these constraints via
the following approach. Let zji and zi, i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . , 4, be defined as follows:
zji =
{
1, if Pr(F kji < U
k
j ) > 1− α
0, else;
(2.11)
zi = min{zji}4j=1. (2.12)
Hence zji is an indicator function and zi is a binary function that admits value of 1 if
the probability that the asset i remains in compliance is at least equal to 1 − α, and 0
otherwise. Therefore, if asset i does not meet constraint (2.10), then we set the asset’s
weight to 0 through the value of zi. With the above definitions, and together with the
short-selling constraint, we have
0 ≤ xi ≤ zi, i = 1, . . . , N. (2.13)
The above monitoring of non-compliance applies to each and every single asset within
the Shariah-compliant portfolio. As argued in Derigs and Marzban (2009), the screening
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> 1− α, j = 1, ..., 4. (2.14)
If the same threshold applies to both the asset level and the portfolio level, then it is easy
to see that screening at the asset level is more stringent than at the portfolio level. In fact,
it is easy to show that Equation (2.10) implies Equation (2.14).
Combining the above screening constraints (i.e. constraint (2.13) for the asset level
screening or constraint (2.14) for the portfolio level screening) with the mean and variance
representations given in (2.8) and (2.9), as well as the short-selling constraint, we are
now ready to present our proposed Markowitz-based Shariah-compliant portfolio. This is








0 ≤ xi ≤ zi, i = 1, . . . , N.
 (2.15)



















> 1− α, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}.

(2.16)
We remark that the screening constraints (either at the asset level or portfolio level) are
imposed explicitly to control the probability of non-compliance. This is achieved through
the input parameter value α. This is new and a desirable feature of the model. By con-
trolling the probability of non-compliance, we minimize the potential adverse impact on
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the performance of the Shariah-compliant portfolio, triggered by the involuntary liquida-
tion. We describe the process to determine the probability of financial screening constraint
in 2.3.2.
2.3 Data and estimation of the model parameters
This section describes the asset data that will be used to illustrate our proposed approach to
constructing Shariah-compliant portfolio. We also discuss estimation methods of the model
parameters. In particular, subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 empirically estimate the parameter
values that are needed for the purification process and the screening process.
The empirical data that we will use in our analysis is a subset of the Jakarta Islamic
Index (JII). JII consists of 30 most liquid Islamic stocks that are listed on the Indonesian
Stock Exchange. In our analysis, we have selected 6 stocks that are representative of their
respective industry classification. This is shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: List of 6 Selected Stocks and Their Industry Classification.
Ticker Name Industry Classification
TLKM Telkom Indonesia mobile telecommunications
UNVR Unilever Indonesia personal products
PGAS Perusahaan Gas Negara exploration&production
WIKA Waskita Karya heavy construction
KLBF Kalbe Farma Pharmaceuticals
ASII Astra International automotive&financial
We calculate the sample mean (µCi ) and sample variance-covariance matrix Σ
C of the
quarterly asset’s return of the 6 selected stocks from January 2008 to October 2018 that





i ) are given in Table 2.5. Other descriptive statistics are provided in
Appendix A. We assume that there is no correlation between each asset’s dividend data.
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Table 2.4: Sample Mean Vector And Sample Variance-Covariance Matrix.
Mean vector
TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
0.059 0.059 0.019 0.067 0.077 0.097
Variance-covariance matrix
Stock TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
TLKM 0.0211 0.0067 0.0069 0.0106 0.013 0.0201
UNVR 0.0067 0.0161 0.0032 0.0049 0.0048 0.0091
PGAS 0.0069 0.0032 0.0334 0.0267 0.0188 0.0189
WIKA 0.0106 0.0049 0.0266 0.0666 0.0307 0.0196
KLBF 0.0131 0.0047 0.0187 0.0307 0.0424 0.0274
ASII 0.0201 0.0091 0.0189 0.0196 0.0274 0.0525
Table 2.5: Sample Mean and Sample Standard Deviation of Dividend Yield.
TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
µDi 0.069 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.023
σDi 0.080 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.035
2.3.1 Purification Data
To get the purification data, for each company we retrieve the NPI and total income
data from each company’s quarterly financial statement from December 2013 to Septem-
ber 2018. While the total income data is readily available from the company’s income
statement, it is more complicated to gather the NPI data. The NPI is typically obtained
from the company’s interest income and other income from non-permissible activities. The
interest income can be found in the company’s income statement. However, to obtain the
non-compliant activities income, we need to check in details the source of income, and
disentangle core income from other income that is generated from non-compliant activi-
ties. As an example let us consider ASII, which is an automotive company. In addition
to selling automotive and other automotive merchandize, ASII also offers insurance and
interest-based financing services to their clients. The latter two financial services are con-
sidered non-permissible, and thus any profit generated from these services must be cleansed
and deducted. Typically, the relevant data is also available from the company’s financial
statement, so that the purification rate can be estimated empirically. Figure 2.1 plots
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the dividend purification rate and the investment purification rate for the six selected





i ). Other descriptive statistics of purification data are provided in Appendix A.
Note that the rates based on the investment purification are consistently higher than that
based on the dividend purification. We also plot constant purification rate in Figure 2.1
which follows a constant purification rate assumption in Derbali et al. (2017) and Hazny
et al. (2020). For each company, we use a constant non permissible income percentage (ψ̃i)
as the average of non permissible data as given by Table 2.8. Furthermore, the purification
rate is calculated by ψ̃iRi. Where Ri is the total return for asset i.
Figure 2.1: Comparison of dividend purification rate (dotted line), investment purification
rate (dashed line), and constant purification rate (stars).
Table 2.6: Sample Mean and Sample Standard Deviation of The Purification Rates
TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
Dividend purification method
ψ1i 0.000158 0.000007 0.000691 0.000616 0.000188 0.007378
Ψ1i 0.000246 0.000008 0.001479 0.001335 0.000347 0.008234
Investment purification method
ψ2i 0.002844 0.000021 0.002483 0.005245 0.000821 0.039644
Ψ2i 0.001392 0.000018 0.001564 0.004853 0.000471 0.021224
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Table 2.7 displays the sample correlation (ρRDi ,P si ) between dividend yield and purifi-
cation rate for each asset i and purification method s. The sample correlation between
dividend yield and dividend purification rate is higher than the sample correlation between
dividend yield and investment purification rate. The strong dependence between dividend
yield and dividend purification rate is straightforward to explain, as it can be inferred from
Equation (2.1).
Table 2.7: Correlation Between Dividend Yield and Purification Rate (ρRDi ,P si )
Asset TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
ρRDi ,P 1i 0.95 0.65 0.23 0.69 0.85 0.93
ρRDi ,P 2i 0.22 0.56 0.23 0.58 0.28 0.88
The sample mean and sample standard deviation of the NPI rate are given in Table 2.8.
Table 2.8: Sample Mean and Sample Standard Deviation of NPI Rate
Asset TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
mean 0.0524 0.0011 0.0624 0.1681 0.0482 0.2362
standard deviation 0.0095 0.0005 0.0377 0.1108 0.0124 0.0405
2.3.2 Screening data and screening distributions
This subsection studies empirically the financial ratios that are used for quantitative screen-
ing. From Subsection 2.1.1, the four commonly adopted financial ratios require the fol-
lowing data: total interest-bearing debt (TID), total cash (C), interest-bearing securities
(IBS), Account receivables (AR), non-permissible income (NPI), and total revenue (TR),
along with three divisors data; i.e. total asset, 24-month, and 36-month market capital-
ization. Most of these data are readily available from the company’s quarterly financial
statement. The historical financial ratios covering 2013 to 2018 are depicted in Figure 2.2
for Leverage ratio (F k1i), Figure 2.3 for Cash ratio (F
k
2i), and Figure 2.4 for Liquidity ratio
(F k3i).
From Figure 2.2, the leverage ratios for TLKM, UNVR, KLBF, and ASII with the total
asset divisor are always higher than those based on the market capitalization. Furthermore,
these ratios are always lower than the 33% threshold, indicating that these companies have
maintained compliance status from the perspective of Shariah, irrespective of divisor. The
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Figure 2.2: Leverage ratio (F k1i) based on the Total Asset divisor (continuous line), 24-
month market capitalization (circles), and 36-month market capitalization (line and point),
with 33% threshold level (dotted line).
same, however, does not apply to companies WIKA and PGAS. While both companies
are Shariah compliant at the beginning of 2014, they revert to the non-compliance status
subsequently, depending on the adopted divisor. More specifically, if the total asset were
the divisor, then the leverage ratio of PGAS is mostly above the 33% threshold level
starting mid 2014. If market capitalization were used as the divisor, PGAS would remain
Shariah-compliant until 2016 and then becomes non-compliant thereafter. These empirical
evidences demonstrate the sensitivity of the adopted divisor, as a company may or may
not be Shariah compliant depending on the chosen divisor.
In comparison to the leverage ratio, a very similar empirical phenomenon can be ob-
served for cash ratio as depicted in Figure 2.3. For a liquidity ratio, Figure 2.4 shows that
there are more companies that are in violation of the Shariah compliance. In addition
to WIKA and PGAS, there are many incidences where both UNVR and KLBF are non-
compliant if the total asset were used as the divisor. This suggests that the liquidity ratio
is a more stringent criterion.
We now turn to the NPI ratio. Among the six companies, ASII is the only company
that has business activities that do no comply with Shariah principles. Figure 2.5 provides
empirical values of the NPI, the total revenue, and the NPI ratio. Notice that the NPI
data in the screening process is different from the one we need in the purification data.
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Figure 2.3: Cash ratio (F k2i) based on the Total Asset divisor (continuous line), 24-month
market capitalization (circles), and 36-month market capitalization (line and point), with
33% threshold level (dotted line).
Figure 2.4: Liquidity ratio (F k3i) based on the Total Asset divisor (continuous line), 24-
month market capitalization (circles), and 36-month market capitalization (line and point),
with 33% threshold level (dotted line).
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In the screening process, we focus only on income generated by non-halal activities, not
including interest-bearing investment. ASII’s NPI ratio is always lower than 5%, which
means that ASII is deemed to be Shariah-compliant.
Figure 2.5: ASII’s non-permissible income, total revenue and non-permission income ratio.
We model the risk of compliance change by fitting a probability distribution to the
financial ratio random variable F kji, i = 1, . . . , 6, j = 1, . . . , 4, k = 1, 2, 3. We first check
the normality of each data by applying the Jarque Berra test from tseries package in R
software. The p-values at the 5% significant level from J-B tests are reported in Table 2.9.
Note that for F4i there is only a reported value for ASII since this is the only company
that has non-permissible income. Except for ASII’s non-permissible ratio, the test indicates
that the other financial ratios are consistent with the null hypothesis of the Jarque-Bera
test (at 5% significance level) that is a joint hypothesis of the skewness being zero and the
excess kurtosis being zero. Additional evidence based on QQ-plots (see B) also support
the normality assumption on modeling most of financial ratios. Some financial ratios
histogram indicates that the distribution is from a left-skewed distribution (for example,
ASII cash ratio F 116) and a right-skewed distribution (for example, WIKA cash ratio F
2
14).
However, in this Chapter, we use the normality assumption for the financial ratios (except
for ASII NPI ratio) where the sample mean and sample standard deviation of F kji are
estimated in Table 2.10. The normality assumption has an advantage in the computation
of the compliance probability at the portfolio level screening (constraint (2.10)) since the
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weighted sum of financial ratios is also normally distributed. Currently, we solve the
Shariah portfolio problem in Subsection 2.4 by using LINGO optimization software which
needs the analytical expression of the constraints. However, since our proposed model
allows for a general distribution assumption, we can solve the problem with other financial
ratio models by using another optimization method which is discussed in Chapter 3.
Table 2.9: p-values from Jarque-Berra normality test on the financial ratios
i TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
F 11i 0.2693 0.3597 0.1745 0.9587 0.4632 0.1414
F 21i 0.3931 0.4891 0.3508 0.1217 0.4584 0.6299
F 31i 0.4199 0.5658 0.4943 0.0897 0.5427 0.6219
F 12i 0.9543 0.1377 0.2049 0.4764 0.6844 0.3944
F 22i 0.9983 0.1133 0.6463 0.2622 0.7585 0.5122
F 32i 0.9617 0.1022 0.5187 0.2961 0.5977 0.5319
F 13i 0.7016 0.7416 0.8627 0.6111 0.6183 0.6185
F 23i 0.9277 0.2094 0.6083 0.2612 0.6099 0.4199
F 33i 0.9809 0.1533 0.5710 0.3061 0.8174 0.4139
F4i 0.0196
Table 2.10: Sample Means and Sample Standard Deviations (in Parenthesis) of F kji.
i TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
F 11i 0.191(0.029) 0.073(0.065) 0.380(0.065) 0.212(0.042) 0.023(0.006) 0.268(0.017)
F 21i 0.105(0.017) 0.004(0.004) 0.340(0.256) 0.383(0.208) 0.004(0.001) 0.235(0.014)
F 31i 0.114(0.017) 0.005(0.004) 0.277(0.217) 0.411(0.201) 0.004(0.001) 0.238(0.015)
F 12i 0.137(0.032) 0.042(0.023) 0.205(0.044) 0.148(0.067) 0.173(0.021) 0.101(0.013)
F 22i 0.076(0.021) 0.003(0.002) 0.163(0.134) 0.285(0.206) 0.033(0.006) 0.089(0.016)
F 32i 0.083(0.023) 0.003(0.002) 0.152(0.121) 0.303(0.202) 0.034(0.005) 0.090(0.017)
F 13i 0.198(0.028) 0.297(0.035) 0.263(0.044) 0.271(0.065) 0.358(0.017) 0.184(0.008)
F 23i 0.109(0.020) 0.019(0.004) 0.217(0.181) 0.498(0.281) 0.068(0.010) 0.162(0.019)
F 33i 0.119(0.022) 0.020(0.005) 0.198(0.161) 0.534(0.271) 0.070(0.007) 0.164(0.022)
Given the non-normality of the ASII’s non-permissible income ratio F46, additional
statistical analysis has also been conducted. For example, we use the function descdist
from fitdistr R package to gain some ideas about possible candidate distributions for F46.
The Cullen and Frey Graph is given in Figure 2.6. The kurtosis and squared skewness
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of our data is plotted as a blue point named “Observation.” It appears that distributions
such as Weibull and Gamma are plausible choices.
Figure 2.6: The Cullen-Frey graph for non-permissible income ratio of ASII F46
Figure 2.7: Densities, CDFs, Q-Q Plot, and P-P Plot Weibull, Gamma, and empirical
distributions of Non-Permissible income ratio (F46)
Figure (2.7) plots the distribution and QQ-Plot of Weibull and Gamma distribution
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and compares to its empirical one. Based on the figure, especially the QQ-Plot, the Weibull
distribution looks better than the Gamma distribution, especially at the tails. The choice
of Weibull distribution is further supported by its smaller Akaike’s Information Criterion
(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values relative to those of the Gamma
distribution (see Table 2.11). For these reasons, we conclude that Weibull with shape
parameter 3.71 and scale parameter 0.18 is the best fitted distribution for ASII’s non-
permissible income ratio.
Table 2.11: AIC and BIC tests for non-permissible income ratio (F46)
Weibull Gamma
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) -147.977 -138.007
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) -145.985 -136.016
Armed with the above analysis, we now revisit the screening constraints based on the




1, if Ukj − µFkji − σFkjiΦ




1, if U4 − F−1F46(1− α) > 0
0, else;
where (µ̂Fkji , σ̂Fkji) are the asset i’s sample mean and sample standard deviation of financial
ratio j with divisor k (as estimated in Table 2.10), Φ is the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of standard normal distribution and FF46(x) is the CDF of the Weibull distribution
with shape parameter κF46 = 3.71 and scale parameter λF46 = 0.18.
For the portfolio screening process, the probabilistic constraint given in (2.14) shows







are normally distributed, we can use the fact that a sum of normally distributed random
variables is also normally distributed (with appropriate mean and standard deviation ad-
justments). As for j = 4, we only need to worry about ASII, since it is the only company
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, for j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (2.17)
6∑
i=1
xiF4i = x6F46 ∼Weibull(x6λF46 , κF46), (2.18)
where Normal(µ, σ) denotes the normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation
σ, and Weibull(λ, κ) denotes the Weibull distribution with scale parameter λ and shape
parameter κ.
In our empirical studies, we apply LINGO software version 17 to solve the Shariah
portfolio problems with asset and portfolio compliance strategies. LINGO is an optimiza-
tion modeling software that may handle linear and non-linear problems with stochastic
variables (see (Lindo Systems, 2021)). We set several values of the target return (µ̂p) in
Shariah portfolio problems (i.e. solving (2.15) and (2.16)) to develop portfolio’s efficient
frontier.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
Based on the parameters estimated in the preceding section, we now study our proposed
Shariah-compliant portfolio by solving both optimization problems (2.15) and (2.16). We
divide our empirical analysis into two subsections, with Subsection 2.4.1 examining the
impact of purification and Subsection 2.4.2 evaluating the impact of both purification and
compliance screening.
2.4.1 The impact of purification process
We can construct a Shariah-compliant portfolio without the screening constraints by solv-
ing the optimization problem (2.15) with Ukj = 1 for all j and k. The required data on
the purification process for all assets are reported in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. The resulting
efficient frontiers, under both dividend purification and investment purification methods,
are depicted in Figure 2.8. Along with these efficient frontiers, we also produce three other
efficient frontiers based on conventional Markowitz model, conventional Markowitz model
with short-selling constraint, and the Shariah-compliant portfolio of Derbali et al. (2017)
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Figure 2.8: Comparison of efficient frontiers
with 0 zakat rate and NPI rates as given in Table 2.8. We exclude zakat rate from our
calculation to focus the analysis on the purification process itself.
Key observations from Figure 2.8 are: (i) the presence of a purification process penalizes
the risk and reward tradeoff, as depicted by the lower efficient frontiers for both dividend
and investment purification; (ii) the dividend purification yields better performance than
investment purification, which is consistent with Table 2.6 and Figure 2.1 showing that
the estimated historical rates for the dividend purification method are lower than the
corresponding investment purification rates; (iii) the efficient frontier from the Shariah-
compliant portfolio of Derbali et al. (2017) and Hazny et al. (2020) presents some rather
interesting phenomenon. For low return and low volatility portfolios, the model actually
yields better risk and return tradeoff than the conventional Markowitz model. This results
can be explained by the fact that the value of purification rate under Derbali et al. (2017)
and Hazny et al. (2020) model, may produce negative values as shown by the empirical data
in Figure (2.1). Furthermore, the negative value of purification rate will increase the total
return. However, in reality a negative purification rate is never happen. As the investor’s
risk tolerance increases by accepting higher risk and higher return portfolio, the risk and
reward tradeoff becomes progressively worse than the conventional Markowitz model. In
fact, for high return and high volatility portfolios, the Derbali et al. (2017) model can also
produce worse performance than our proposed Shariah-compliant portfolio with dividend
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purification method.
2.4.2 The impact of both purification and screening processes
Recall that our proposed Shariah-compliant portfolio model imposes probabilistic con-
straints to control the risk of compliance change via the parameter α. The objective of
this subsection is to assess the impact of these constraints in addition to the purification
process. By solving the proposed Shariah-compliant optimization problem (2.15) (for asset
screening with α = 0.10) and problem (2.16) (for portfolio screening with α = 0.01), the
respective efficient frontiers are depicted in upper and lower panels of Figure 2.9. Consis-
tent with the recommendation by most Shariah boards, we consider financial thresholds
Ukj = 0.33 for j = 1, 2, 3 and U
k
4 = 0.05, together with divisors k = 1, 2, 3 based on total
asset, 24-month market capitalization, and 36-month market capitalization, respectively.
The on-screening efficient frontier, i.e. without imposing the probabilistic constraints, is
also plotted in Figure 2.9 to benchmark against the screening. This efficient frontier cor-
responds to the one in Figure 2.8 with dividend purification.
We now focus on the asset screening. This gives a more transparent way of assessing the
impact of screening, since the probabilistic constraint is applied to each asset separately.
By comparing the efficient frontiers in Figure 2.9, we can see that the effect of screening
is more pronounced on the left part of the efficient frontier. Let us assess the impact
of screening by comparing attainable minimum and maximum risk portfolios. Without
screening, the optimal tradeoff for the maximum risk portfolio is (0.1656, 0.1279), where the
first and second coordinates denote the portfolio’s standard deviation and expected return,
respectively. This optimal portfolio is similarly obtained with screening, irrespective of the
divisors. However, the minimum risk portfolios portray a vastly different picture. The
minimum risk portfolio for no screening is (0.1050, 0.0715), which is quite similar to the
screening with divisors 2 and 3. If the adopted divisor is total asset, then the minimum risk
portfolio becomes (0.1615, 0.1261), which differs significantly from the other minimum risk
portfolios (see Figure 2.10 which magnifies upper part of the efficient frontier of Figure 2.9).
These comparisons indicate that the risk of compliance change is highly dependent on the
screening divisor, and that the presence of probabilistic constraints could severely limit the
optimal portfolios.
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Figure 2.9: The impact of screening with different divisors. Upper panel gives the asset
level screening (with α = 0.10) and lower panel is for the portfolio screening (with α = 0.01)
30
Figure 2.10: Magnified efficient frontier of upper panel of Figure 2.9 for portfolio risk over
the range (0.15, 0.17).
Table 2.12: Comparison of Asset Allocations for Minimum Risk Portfolio With and With-
out Screening.
Method Risk Return TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
no screening 0.1050 0.0715 0.1933 0.5502 0.2117 0 0.0446 0
screening with divisor
k = 1 0.1615 0.1261 0.8196 0 0 0 0 0.1803
k = 2 0.1108 0.0833 0.2230 0.6266 0 0 0.1502 0
k = 3 0.1108 0.0833 0.2230 0.6266 0 0 0.1502 0
A more illuminating insight can be gained from Table 2.12, which produces the asset
allocation for the minimum risk portfolios. First, the results based on screening divisors 2
and 3 are identical. This should not be surprising since both divisors are based on market
capitalization (24-month average vs 36-month average). Because of the averaging, both
divisors tend to be quite similar. Second, and more importantly, is how the distribution of
the asset allocation changes from no screening to screening. These changes are triggered
by the non-compliance probabilistic constraints and hence highlight their importance. The
changes can be understood by noticing that the probabilistic constraints are imposed to
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keep the risk of non-compliance at an acceptable level. Moreover, as soon as one of the
financial ratios crosses the thresholds, then the asset will be deemed non-compliant. Hence
the asset allocation will be re-distributed from assets with a high non-compliance risk to
assets with a low non-compliance risk. To illustrate this point, let us consider the total
asset divisor screening. Based on the empirical estimates of F kji in Table 2.10, assets such as
UNVR, PGAS, and KLBF exhibit a high non-compliance risk due to their high expected
financial ratios (in at least one of them). For example, µ̂F 112 = 0.297 (liquidity ratio),
µ̂F 113 = 0.380 (leverage ratio) and µ̂F 135 = 0.358 (liquidity ratio). Hence imposing the non-
compliance probabilistic constraints may dramatically change the asset allocations from
positive weights (with no screening) to zero, as confirmed in Table 2.12. The portfolio
weights for screening with divisors 2 and 3 are also reduced to zero for PGAS. Similar
justification applies by noticing their high leverage ratios, as can be inferred from either
Table 2.10 or Figure 2.2, showing that most of the historical leverage ratios exceed 33%
threshold.
It is also instructive to focus on UNVR. This asset has the highest investment weight
under no screening and screening with divisors 2 and 3, while no investment under total
asset screening divisor. By standardizing the reward-to-risk measure (defined as expected
return divided by standard deviation), UNVR is found to have the highest ratio using
either capital appreciation rate or dividend yield (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5). This implies
that on its own, UNVR is a highly investable asset and thus explains its highest portfolio
weight without screening. Under screening with divisors 2 and 3, UNVR is deemed to
have very low non-compliance risk with an expected financial ratio not exceeding 2% (see
Table 2.10). Hence even with these screenings, UNVR is still a desirable asset and thus
accounts for its highest investment proportion. However, UNVR is highly non-compliant
asset according to the total asset divisor criterion. t Therefore, we have to forgo UNVR
to reduce the non-compliance risk and avoid involuntary liquidation under the screening
constraint with total asset divisor. This, in part, explains the limited optimal portfolios as
depicted in Figure 2.10.
So far we have focused on the screening at the asset level. For the portfolio level
screening (lower panel of Figure 2.9), we similarly observe that the left part of the efficient
frontier is affected the most. The magnitude of the impact, as compared to the asset
level screening, appears to be less pronounced. This is to be expected since the portfolio
screening is less restrictive than the asset screening. Consequently the performance of the
portfolio screening should be better than the asset screening.
Our final set of comparison is to examine the impact of α. For brevity, we only consider
the asset screening with total asset as the divisor. The resulting efficient frontiers are
plotted in Figure 2.11 for α ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}, together with the no screening efficient frontier.
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Higher α implies less stringent conditions on the non-compliance risk, , and hence the
resulting efficient frontiers converge to the non-screening efficient frontier, as shown in the
figure.
Figure 2.11: The impact of α on efficient frontier (asset level screening).
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discuss two important features in the Shariah compliant portfolio,
namely purification and screening process. We have proposed an effective Shariah-compliant
portfolio model that is more consistent with the current practice. It has the desirable fea-
tures of incorporating both stochastic purification and non-compliance probabilistic con-
straints. The former addresses the constant purification rate that is commonly assumed
in the existing literature, while the latter provides an effective way of controlling the non-
compliance risk, which can have an adverse effect on the portfolio strategy. The conducted
empirical studies affirm the importance of these features. In particular, they show that
the effect of imposing non-compliance probabilistic constraints is highly sensitive to the
adopted divisors and that these constraints can be an effective way of mitigating the risk of






This chapter provides the extension of the mean-variance Shariah portfolio model to the
multiperiod time setting. Some important contributions of this study to the existing liter-
ature include:
• To the best of our knowledge, our study of the Shariah portfolio optimization problem
in a multiperiod time setting is the first study in the Islamic finance literature.
• In addition to dividend and investment purifications that have been discussed in
Chapter 2, we propose a modification and an extension of Hazny et al. (2020) and
Derbali et al. (2017) model. The proposed modified model is more realistic than the
original one because it can avoid negative values of purification.
• In our study we adopt two assumptions about the dynamic of the financial screening
ratios. In the first one, we assume that the financial ratios are independent and follow
beta distributions. The second assumption relaxes the independence assumption by
allowing the financial ratios to follow the Beta-AR(p,q) model.
• We also consider other possible constraints based on the current Shariah rules. They
include a restriction on the short selling activity and a limitation of portfolio leverage
facility.
• To solve the multiperiod Shariah portfolio problem, we follow the idea of a forward
and backward algorithms proposed by Cong and Oosterlee (2016). While the authors
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apply the algorithms in the context of conventional portfolio problems with bounded
constraints, we use the algorithms to solve the Shariah-compliant portfolio problem
with more complex constraints.
• We also perform several numerical calculations to study the impact of Shariah rules
on the dynamic of optimal asset allocations and the portfolio’s performance.
3.1 Problem formulation for multiperiod shariah port-
folio with purification process
We assume that the financial market is defined on a probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P)
with a bounded time period [0, T ]. The state space Ω is the set of all realizations of the
financial market within the time horizon [0, T ]. F is the sigma algebra of events at time T ,
i.e. F = FT . The filtration {Ft}0≤t≤T is generated by the price processes of the financial
market and augmented with the null sets of F . Probability measure P is defined on F . In
addition to the financial market information, in the Shariah portfolio we need the financial
information from the companys’ financial statement to calculate the purification rate and
the financial screening ratios. Suppose that Gt is the smallest σ-algebra such that the
purification rate and financial ratios are measurable at time t. We denote by Ft ∨ Gt the
smallest sigma-algebra generated by the events in Ft and Gt.
We assume that the portfolio consists of 1 risk-free asset and N risky assets. In the
Shariah asset class, the riskless asset could be a fixed rate sukuk (Islamic bond) (Shazly and
Tripathy, 2013) or other type of sukuk issued either by a government that has sound fiscal
equilibrium or by a highly rated corporation (Krichene, 2013). In this multiperiod setting,
we assume that the portfolio can be traded at discrete time opportunities t = [0,∆t, . . . , T−
∆t], before terminal time T . If the total number of re-balancing opportunities before
terminal time T is M , then ∆t = T
M
.
At each trading time t, an investor is seeking the best investment strategy that maxi-
mizes the expected value of the terminal wealth and minimizes the investment risk
vt(Wt) = max
{xs}T−∆ts=t
{E(WT |Ft ∨ Gt)− λV ar(WT |Ft ∨ Gt)} (3.1)
where Wt is the wealth at time t, xt = [x1,t, x2,t, ..., xN,t] is the asset allocations of in-
vestors’ wealth in the risky assets over time interval [t, t+∆t), and λ is a trade-off between
maximizing the profit and minimizing the risk. It captures the risk aversion of the investor.
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i,t the risk-free return, the capital appreciation rate, and
the dividend yield of asset i over time interval [t, t+∆t), respectively. For simplicity, in our
model we assume the risk-free return R0 to be constant. An important difference between
the conventional and the Shariah portfolio is the application of cleansing or purification
by which the portfolio return is deducted by non-permissible income percentage (Hashim
et al., 2017). If we assume that P si,t is the purification rate per share of asset i at time t




, for i = 1, . . . , N, t = 0, . . . , T, and s ∈ {1, 2}, (3.2)
where Si,t is the stock price of asset i at time t, and p
s
i,t is the amount of purification
per share for asset i at time t, with the purification type s. psi,t is calculated based on
Equation (2.1) in Chapter 2.1.2. Under the assumption of self-financing trading strategy,






























, t = 0, . . . , T −∆t, s ∈ {1, 2}, (3.5)




1,t . . . R
ps
N,t] being
the column vector of purified excess returns with purification type s. When P si,t+∆t = 0 for
t = 0, . . . , T , and i = 1, . . . , N , then the wealth dynamic of the Shariah compliant portfolio
is equal as the wealth dynamic of the conventional portfolio.
In Subsection 3.2, we present a method of solving the problem of optimal portfolio
selection through a pre-commitment strategy approach. Under this approach, we need to
assume that the purified excess returns {Rpst }T−∆tt=0 are statistically independent (Cong and
Oosterlee, 2016). One popular model for Rpst is a geometric Brownian motion. Before
explaining the proposed algorithm to solve the Shariah portfolio problem, in Subsection
3.1.1 we describe several constraints that are used in this research.
3.1.1 Incorporating Shariah Constraints
In Chapter 2.1.1 we have explained that in a Shariah-compliant portfolio, investors can
invest their funds only in the subset of assets that complies with Shariah rules. There
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are two stages of screening activities in practice: the first one is the sector and activity-
based screening, whereas the second one is the quantitative or financial screening (Hashim
et al., 2017). In general, there are four types of financial ratios needed to be screened,
namely: leverage ratio, cash ratio, liquidity ratio, and non-permissible income (NPI) ratio
(Derigs and Marzban, 2008). These ratios should not exceed the permissible threshold to
be considered as Shariah-compliant.
Similar with the notation in Chapter 2.2.3, we denote the 4 types of financial ratios of
asset i at time t by F kji,t ∈ [0, 1], with j = 1 for cash ratio, j = 2 for leverage ratio, j = 3
for liquidity ratio, and j = 4 for NPI ratio. For each financial ratio j, there are 3 different
definitions of financial ratio, which depend on the chosen divisor: total asset (k = 1),
24-month market capitalization (k = 2), or 36-month market capitalization (k = 3). The
calculation of F kji,t is described in Chapter 2.1.1. For simplicity, in this Chapter, we only
use the total asset divisor to define financial ratios. From now on, we will denote the
financial ratio by Fji,t, without the superscript k. It is possible to use our approach to
incorporate other definitions of financial ratios.
In this study, we use two model assumptions for Fji,t. In the first one, we use time in-
dependent assumption, while the second assumption relaxes the independence assumption.
1. Time independent model of financial ratio.
For the time independent assumption, we assume that Fji,t, t = 0,∆t, . . . , T , are
independent and follow the beta distribution with parameters αBji > 0 and β
B
ji > 0.
We choose a beta distribution because the value of Fji,t lies between zero and one.
















ji−1, 0 ≤ Fji,t ≤ 1, t = 0, . . . , T,
(3.6)
where Γ(.) is the gamma function. Under the above assumption, the mean and

















2. Time dependent model of financial ratio.
For the time dependent assumption, we assume Fji,t to follow the Beta-ARMA(p,q)
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model, as introduced by Rocha and Neto (2009). Suppose that Gt is the small-
est σ-algebra such that the variables {Fji,s}0≤s≤t are measurable. Under the Beta-











equation (3.7), we can see that Fji,t follows a beta distribution with parameter πji,tδji











with E(εji,t) = 0 and V ar(εji,t) =
πji,t(1−πji,t)
1+δji
. In Equation (3.8), we assume that g(.)
is a strictly monotonic and twicely differentiable link function that maps (0, 1) into





After defining the dynamic of financial ratios, now we are ready to formulate some
constraints for Shariah compliant portfolio.
Shariah screening constraint
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, a portfolio is considered Shariah compliant if all of the
screening financial ratios Fji,t are less than their permissible boundaries Uj. Hence, at
the beginning of each investment period [t, t + ∆t), t = 0, . . . , T − ∆t, we need to do
the screening check either at the asset level or the portfolio level. Under the asset level
screening process, if the financial ratio Fji,t is greater than the permissible boundary Uj,
for some j = {1, 2, 3, 4}, then at time t we need to exclude asset i from the portfolio. This
procedure can be written mathematically as follows:
xi,t ≤ Yi,t, i = 1, .., N, t = 0, . . . , T −∆t, (3.10)
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where
Yi,t = min{yji,t}4j=1 (3.11)
yji,t =
{
ui, if Fji,t < Uj
0, else,
(3.12)
and ui is the ceiling constraint as explained in equation (3.18). If we apply the screening




xi,tFji,t < Uj, j = 1, . . . , 4, t = 0, . . . , T −∆t. (3.13)
Shariah Sustainibility Constraint
Since the Islamic equity investment process is dynamic in nature, and new financial infor-
mation and corporate news are published over time, the screening financial ratio results
change over time. These events have an impact on Shariah compliance. An asset may
turn from compliant to non-compliant, which results into a forced liquidation of the asset
position from the portfolio, if included. For example, the company may become highly
leveraged through rising capital in the form of debt as we have seen in Figure 2.2.
Marzban (2008, 2011) emphasize the importance of maintaining the status of compli-
ance in the Shariah portfolio for two reasons:
1. Sustainable shariah compliance.
Islamic investors are investing in Islamic products because they want the investment
to comply with their beliefs and religious principles. This means that Islamic investors
prefer Shariah-compliance over speculative return and risk. Thus, for some Islamic
investors it is important that the company they are investing in is conventionally
compliant over time and not accidentally compliant over the current time period
only.
2. Better Fund Performance
In a shariah portfolio, if the asset switches from being compliant to non-compliant,
then the investors need to liquidate the assets. When the market is bearish, then the
investors may experience a substantial loss. If the investors or fund managers can
predict the possibility of the asset being liquidated, then they can mitigate the loss.
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In Chapter 2.2.3 we have proposed a probabilistic constraint to measure the possibility
of the Shariah portfolio to turn to be non-compliant in the future period. Suppose that
α ∈ (0, 1] is the maximum acceptable probability that a financial ratio exceeds a permissible
boundary over a future time interval. If we apply screening at the asset level, then an asset
with a sustainable probability smaller than a preferred level 1− α can be eliminated prior
to the optimization. Hence, the probabilistic constraint under the asset level screening
assumption can be described as
0 ≤ xi,t ≤ Zi,t+∆t, i = 1, .., N, (3.14)
where
Zi,t+∆t = min{zji,t+∆t}4j=1 (3.15)
zji,t+∆t =
{
ui, if Pr(Fji,t+∆t < Uj|Fji,t) > 1− α
0, else.
(3.16)








> 1− α, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. (3.17)
Floor and ceiling constraints
By using floor and ceiling constraints, fund managers are defining their preferences and
binding requirements in terms of maximum (ceiling) and minimum (floor) permissible
investment in each of the assets considered for investment. These restrictions can be
formulated as follow:
li ≤ xi,t ≤ ui, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 0, . . . , T −∆t, (3.18)
where li and ui are the lower and the upper limits, respectively, of asset i.
Shortselling restriction
As discussed in Chapter 2, most Islamic scholars agree that shortselling is prohibited in
Shariah capital market because muslim investors can not sell something what the investors
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do not own (Dusuki and Abozaid, 2008). Only the Shariah Advisory Council of the Secu-
rities Comission of Malaysia (SAC) went againts the majority by permitting short selling
in Malaysia since 2006 (Sifat and Mohamad, 2016). If shortselling is prohibited, then we
need to add the following constraint:
xi,t ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 0, . . . , T −∆t. (3.19)
Portfolio leverage constraint
Let x0,t = 1 −
∑N
i=1 xi,t be the allocation of the riskless asset at time t. The negative
value of x0,t means that the investor has sold the risk-free asset to buy more of the risky
asset. Krichene (2013) allows a negative value of x0,t in their constructed Shariah portfolio
model. In practice, investors may borrow money from the Islamic money market by selling
Sukuk or other Shariah compliant fixed income instruments. However, this facility is only
applicable for investors who can issue money market instruments, like government Sukuk
or corporate Sukuk.
In a conventional capital market, small or retail investors can use margin facility to
leverage their portfolio. However, margin trading with interest is forbidden in Shariah
capital market. Therefore, if we assume that there is no leveraging facility, then we need
to impose a leverage constraint:
N∑
i=1
xi,t ≤ 1, t = 0, . . . , T −∆t. (3.20)
3.2 Proposed method to solve the multiperiod shariah
portfolio optimization problem
Recall that the objective of a multiperiod portfolio selection problem is finding a set of
asset allocations xt, t = 0, 1, .., T − ∆t, that maximize value function (3.1) subject to
wealth restriction (3.5). This optimization problem belongs to a class of dynamic op-
timization problems (sometimes called dynamic programming), because it is based on a
sequence of interrelated optimal decisions (Hillier and Lieberman, 2015). The dynamic
programming approach is usually solved by a backward recursive procedure. Under this
method, we need the separabality condition of the objective function (Stevanov, 2001).
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Unfortunately, our objective function (3.1) is not a separable function due to the non-
linearity of conditional variances. The expectation is a linear function because for all
s ≤ t, E[E[WT |Ft ∨ Gt|Fs ∨ Gs]] = E[WT |Fs ∨ Gs]], however the variance function does
not satisfy the analogous condition V ar[V ar[WT |Ft ∨ Gt]]|Fs ∨ Gs]] 6= V ar[WT |Fs ∨ Gs]].
Hence, we need to transform the objective function into a tractable separable function. We
use the same transformation as the one applied by Li and Ng (2000), Cong and Oosterlee






)2|Ft ∨ Gt] (3.21)
where γ = 1
λ
+ 2Ex∗ [WT |Ft ∨ Gt] for t = 0, .., T −∆t.
Li and Ng (2000) have proved that if the excess return Rpst,i is statistically independent,
then the solution of the LQ problem (3.21) is identical to the solution of the problem (3.1).
We adopt this approach in our study, and from now on our objective function is the
quadratic problem (3.21) subject to the budget constraint (3.5) and the Shariah constraints.
In the literature, this approach is called a pre-commitment strategy (Basak and Chabakauri
(2010),Cong and Oosterlee (2017b)). The advantage of this approach is that the Bellman
dynamic programming principle is applicable to the objective function (3.21), and hence
the backward recursive method can be applied to solve this optimization problem.
In this study, we implement backward dynamic programming through Monte Carlo
based simulation proposed by Cong and Oosterlee (2016). The authors apply backward
differential dynamic programming, and impose a multi-stage strategy solution as the initial
solutions to the backward approach. Firstly, the multi stage strategy is performed in a
forward recursive scheme to generate the initial values of {xt}T−∆tt=1 . This step is known
as the forward algorithm procedure. Next, the solution is updated through the dynamic
programming in a backward recursive manner, which is called a backward algorithm pro-
cedure. We apply the bundling and regression technique in the backward algorithm. While
Cong and Oosterlee (2016) apply the method to the conventional portfolio problem with
a bounded or a box constraint, we adopt the method to the Shariah portfolio problem
with more general constraints as described in Subsection 3.1.1. The next two subsections
describe in detail the forward and backward algorithms that we have used in this research.
3.2.1 Forward Algorithm
The purpose of the forward algorithm is to find a sub-optimal solution, which we denote
by {x̃t}T−∆tt=0 . The idea of this method is to find the optimal asset allocations such that
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the wealth Wt achieves a certain target level at time t, for each t ∈ [∆t, . . . , T ]. Then, at
time t, we put all of the money in the risk-free asset so that the wealth at the terminal
time is equal to the final target level γ
2
. Therefore, to achieve the final target level, we set
the intermediate target level as the final target’s discounted value. This method is known
as the multistage strategy (Cong and Oosterlee, 2016). Mathematically, we can represent
the above strategy as follow:















For a problem without any constraints, the optimal allocation in problem (3.22) can be




























The corresponding value function at time t is:
Jt(Wt) = (WtR0 − τt+∆t)2(1− (µs)T
∑−1
µs). (3.25)
To find the optimal allocation for a portfolio consisting of one risky asset and one
risk-free asset with box constraints (for example, constraint (3.18)), we solve first the
unconstrained problem using (3.24). Then, we penalize the solution on the bounded con-
straints by comparing the value functions (3.25). When solving a portfolio problems with
2 risky assets and 1 risk-free asset, this procedure is equivalent to solving five portfolio
problems with 1 risky asset and 1 risk-free asset, and then choosing the set of allocations
with the lowest value function. For problems with a larger number of risky assets and
bounded constraints, we can adopt the same idea. To solve a problem with more complex
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constraints (for example, constraints (3.13), (3.17), and (3.20) ), we use a Quadratic Pro-
gramming method by means of a numerical approach. In this research we use quadprog
function in Matlab.
The following is the procedure that we have used to find the optimal solution for the
Shariah-compliant portfolio based on the multistage strategy algorithm.
• Step 1. Choose the final target level γ and specify a set of parameters and the
distribution of the purified asset return Rpsi,t and the financial ratio Fji,t. We assume
that the following information is given:
– initial wealth W0
– risk-free asset return R0 ≥ 1
– the definition of the purification process, either dividend purification (s = 1) or
investment purification (s = 2)
– the screening permissible boundary Uj, j = 1, . . . , 4
– the set of Shariah constraints that is described in Subsection 3.1.1 based on
either the chosen Shariah ruling sources or the investor preferences. For example,
whether the leverage facility is permitted or not (constraint (3.20)), and the
screening process at the asset level (constraint (3.10)) or at the portfolio level
(constraint (3.13)).
• Step 2. Generate n paths of the purified excess return Rpsi,t for i = 1, . . . , N and
t = ∆t, . . . , T . Also simulate the financial ratio F ij,t for i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , 4,
and t = 0, . . . , T .
• Step 3. Calculate the intermediate target values τt for t = ∆t, . . . , T as described in
(3.23).
• Step 4. Starting at the initial state, and for each path k = 1, . . . , n, solve problem
(3.22) subject to specified constraints to get optimal asset allocation x̃t(k):








, t = 0, . . . , T−∆t.







we use Wt+∆t(k) to find x̃t+∆t(k). Repeat this step in forward fashion, starting from
the initial time until time T −∆t.
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3.2.2 Backward Algorithm
The solution that we have found in Section 3.2.1 is the sub-optimal solution. To get the
optimal asset allocation, we need to continue the process through a backward algorithm
that will be discussed in this Subsection. We use the sub-optimal asset allocation x̃t(k) and
the corresponding wealth Wt+∆t(k) for t = 0, . . . , T − ∆t and k = 1, . . . , n, that we have
found through the forward algorithm in Section 3.2.1 as the initial guess of the optimal
solution for backward algorithm.
Suppose that A is the admissible set for the asset allocation based on the specified
constraints from Step 1 of the forward algorithm in the Subsection 3.2.1. Then we can
rewrite the objective function (3.21) into the following recursive relation
Jt(Wt) = min
xt∈A
E[Jt+∆t(Wt+∆t)|Ft ∨ Gt], (3.26)
= min
xt∈A
{E[Jt+∆t(Wt(xtRpst +R0))|Ft ∨ Gt]} (3.27)
with JT (WT ) = (WT − γ2 )
2. In general, this kind of problem needs to be solved using
a backward recursive approach. In this research we adopt the backward programming
method of Cong and Oosterlee (2016) to solve the portfolio problem (3.27). While Cong
and Oosterlee (2016) is limited to the conventional portfolio problem with a bounded or
box constraint problem, we apply the algorithm to the Shariah portfolio problem with
more complex constraints as described in the Subsection 3.1.1.
A common approach to the problem described in (3.27) is to apply a simulation based
approach by varying xt around the initial solution x̃t. Firstly we need to construct an
admissible control set Aη = [x̃t − η, x̃t + η]. Then we transform the recursive problem
(3.27) into the following truncated problem:
Jt(Wt) = min
xt∈A
{E[Jt+∆t(Wt+∆t)|Ft ∨ Gt, Wt+∆t ∈ Dt+∆t} (3.28)
where
Dt+∆t := {Wt+∆t|Wt+∆t = Wt.(xtRpst +R0),xt ∈ Aη}. (3.29)
Using this transformation, we can solve the local optimization problem in the restricted
domain Dt+∆t. We apply a Stochastic Grid Bundling Method (SGBM) to solve this trun-
cated problem. The SGBM method was firstly introduced by Jain and Oosterlee (2015) to
solve the Bermudan option pricing problem. This method combines the Monte Carlo path
simulation and the dynamic programming techniques to determine optimal policies. To in-
crease its computational efficiency, the authors propose regression and bundling techniques
to approximate the continuation value function Jt(Wt) at each time step.
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The bundling technique is used to approximate domain (3.29) by:
D̂t+∆t = {Wt+∆t|Wt+∆t = Ŵt(x̃t.Rpst +R0), Ŵt ∈ Bd} (3.30)
where Bd = [Wt− d,Wt + d]. By using this approximation, we vary Wt by considering the
paths with the state are around (t,Wt). In order to solve the truncated problem (3.28) at
state (t,Wt), we need to determine the value function Jt+∆t(Wt+∆t) conditional on Wt+∆t ∈
D̂t+∆t. In this research we employ the regress-later approach to approximate the value
function. For all paths in the domain Bd, we regress {Jt+∆t(Wt+∆t)} on the polynomial up
to order two formed by {Wt+∆t} and obtain the parameters {ap}2p=0. Suppose that x∗bt is
the optimal control of problem (3.28). The value function is then approximated by:








The reason for using polynomials up to order two for the regression basis function is the
fact that the value function is quadratic. In the local optimization problem, the truncated
problem is considered a piecewise quadratic function. Hence, the polynomial up to order
two should be sufficient (Fu et al., 2010).
After employing the forward algorithm described in Subsection 3.2.1, we employ the
backward algorithm in the following steps:
• Step 1 Generate an initial guess of asset allocations x̃t(k) and the corresponding
wealth Wt+∆t(k) for time t = 0, . . . , T −∆t and path k = 1, . . . , n, and calculate the
initial value function JT (WT (k)) = (WT (k)− γ2 )
2
• Step 2 Solve the objective problem (3.28) using the following bundling and regression
technique:
1. Bundle paths into B partitions, with each bundle having nB paths so that the
paths inside the bundles have a similar number of paths and similar wealth
values at time t. Denote the bundles by {W bt (k)}
nB
k=1.




t+∆t) by regression using a polynomial up to order
two.
3. Find the minimum function of E[f bt+∆t(W
b
t+∆t)|Wt = W bt (k),Ft ∨ Gt] under the




4. Since at time t we have {W bt (k)}
nB
k=1 and the allocations {x̂bt(k)}
nB
k=1, we can
calculate the value function {Ĵ bt (k)}
nB
k=1 using regression as described by equation
(3.31).
• Step 3 Update the initial guess of asset allocations through the following procedure:
1. Calculate {J̃ bt (k)}
nB
k=1 using the old guess {x̃bt(k)}
nB
k=1 by following the same ap-
proach as in step 2.4
2. If J̃ bt (k) > Ĵ
b
t (k), we choose x̂
b
t(k), otherwise we keep the old guess x̃
b
t(k) as the
new optimal solution. We denote the updated allocations by {x∗bt (k)}
nB
k=1
• Step 4 Use the updated allocations {x∗bt (k)}
nB
k=1 to calculate the value function {J bt (k)}
nB
k=1.
Use these updated values to calculate the optimal allocations at t − ∆t. We iter-
ate this process in a backward fashion until the initial time to get {x∗bt (k)}
nB
k=1 for
t = 0, . . . , T −∆t.
After one iteration of the backward algorithm, we will get one set of the updated asset
allocation. Cong and Oosterlee (2016) apply Bellman operator in Equation (3.27) to prove
that the backward recursive updating process is monotone in which J10 (W0) ≥ J20 (W0) ≥
· · · ≥ J l0(W0) and the value function will converge to J∗0 (W0) = liml→∞ J l0(W0) with J l0
being the value function at time 0 after l iterations of the backward procedures. Hence, we
can perform the backward algorithm in several iterations to get a satisfactory result. In our
research, we use the solution from the multi-stage strategy obtained in Subsection 3.2.1
as the initial guess for the first iteration. Then, we use the updated solution from the
backward procedure obtained in Step 4 as the initial solution of the next iteration of the
backward procedure.
3.3 Numerical Examples
In this section, we apply the proposed method described in Section 3.2 to generate the
efficient frontiers of Shariah portfolios. An efficient frontier is generated by assigning
different values of γ and solving the corresponding problem. As we obtain the optimal asset
allocations for each γ, we can calculate the mean and standard deviation of the optimal
portfolio’s wealth at the terminal time denoted by E[WT ] and Std[WT ], respectively.
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3.3.1 Conventional portfolio with 1 risky asset and 1 non-risky
asset
Before we apply the optimization method to the Shariah portfolio problem, we check the
performance of the proposed method in the context of a conventional portfolio consisting
of 1 risky asset and 1 risk-free asset. In the conventional portfolio, there is no purification
process. We denote the risky asset rate of return without purification as Rp01,t. In our
simulation study we use the same input parameters as in Bielecki et al. (2005) :
R0 = 1.06, R
p0
1,t ∼ N(µ1, σ21) with µ1 = 0.12, σ1 = 0.15, T = 1 year, and W0 = 1. Zhou
and Li (2000) provide the analytical solution (3.32) for this problem in a continuous time
setting
E[WT ] = 0.0618 + 0.4165Std[WT ]. (3.32)
In addition to the unconstrained conventional portfolio, We also add a no-bankruptcy
constraint to the conventional portfolio, i.e :
Wt(x1,tR
p0
1,t+∆t +R0) ≥ 0, t = 0, . . . , T −∆t. (3.33)
We impose the following constraint to ensure that the no-bankruptcy condition (3.33) is






, t = 0, . . . , T, (3.34)
where Rp0,1−ν1,t and R
p0,ν
1,t are the ν- and 1−ν- quantiles of the excess return R
p0
1,t, respectively.
In this example we set ν = 10−8.
Bielecki et al. (2005) derived an analytical solution for continuous mean variance prob-



























)− e−0.06N( ln η−0.02
0.4
)
(E[WT ] + 1)
]0.5
(3.36)
with η ∈ [0,∞).
48
We plot the analytical solution (3.32) for the non-constraint problem and solution (3.35)
and (3.36) for no-bankruptcy problem in Figure 3.1. We also generate the efficient frontier
using the assumption of a discrete time model, as proposed in this research, with M = 32
and sample size n = 50000. We provide the results from the forward and backward methods
with up to four iterations.
(a) Simulation Results (b) Zoom
Figure 3.1: Simulation results with no-constraint using the forward method M=32, and
bankruptcy constraint using the forward method with M=32, and the backward method
with M=32 and the number of iteration up to 4. The results are compared with the ana-
lytical solution (3.32) with no constraint, and analytical solution (3.35) with constraints.
For the unconstrained problem, the efficient frontier generated by the forward method
is very close to the analytical solution. This result is consistent with the Cong and Oost-
erlee (2016) findings that for the non-constraint problem, the solution from the forward
method is equivalent to the optimal asset allocation for the problem (3.21). Hence for the
unconstrained problem the multistage strategy provides accurate approximations to the
optimal solution. Note that the analytical solution is provided for continuous time rebal-
ancing, while our simulation uses the assumption of discrete time model. Hence slightly
different results between the simulation and analytical solution are reasonable.
For the constrained problem, the simulation result generated by the forward method
underestimates the analytical result. After applying four iterations of the backward recur-
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sive method, the efficient frontier gets closer to the analytical solution. Cong and Oosterlee
(2016) also apply 4 iterations of the backward method, which produce satisfactory results.
In order to generate efficient frontiers for the Shariah portfolio problem that we consider
in the next section, we utilize the forward and the backward methods with 4 iterations.
3.3.2 Shariah Compliant Portfolio with 1 Risky Asset and 1
Risk-free Asset
Incorporating purification and restriction to shortselling and leverage facility
In this part we provide some simulation results to examine the impact of Shariah vari-
ables, namely: no-shortsell, no-leverage, and purification on the performance of portfolio
containing 1 risky asset and 1 risk free asset. In this simulation study, instead of defining
the stochastic dynamics of the capital appreciation rate Rci,t, dividend yield R
d
i,t, and pu-
rification rate P si,t separately, as in Subsection 2.3.1, we define the dynamic of the excess
purified return Rpsi,t itself. The problem with modeling the different components separately
is that the independence assumption that is required for the validity of our algorithm is
not satisfied. We can see from Figure 2.1 that the purification rate exhibits some temporal
dependence. In each year, the data has an upward trend, with the lowest value in the first
quarter and highest at the fourth quarter. This trend can be explained by the fact that
the purification rate is a function of NPII (non permissible income including interest) (see
Equation (2.1)). The quarterly NPII data is the accumulated data within the same year
and hence this data is lowest at the beginning and highest at the end of the year. This
suggests that the assumption that the purification rate is statistically independent is not
realistic. However, the independence assumption is required in the mean-variance portfolio
with pre-commitment approach (Cong and Oosterlee, 2016; Li and Ng, 2000). To overcome
this problem, we model the dynamic of the purified return Rpsi,t itself, which can be justified
by the fact that the independence assumption is acceptable for most of stock return data
and usually the purification rate is of much smaller magnitude than the return itself. In
our simulation study we assume that the risky asset follows a geometric Brownian motion
with drift µpsi and volatility σ
ps
i .
Figure 3.2 shows the empirical data of quarterly purified return of ASII.JK from 2013
to 2018 that we have used in this simulation. The dividend and investment purification






i,t − P si,t, s ∈ {1, 2}. (3.37)
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We may see from Figure 3.2 that return data with dividend purification is always higher
than the return data with investment purification. This is because the investment pu-
rification rate is higher than the dividend purification rate data (see Figure 2.1). We also
calculate the purified asset return based on the Shariah portfolio model proposed by Hazny
et al. (2020) and Derbali et al. (2017) in Equation (3.38), in which
Rp3i,t = (1− ψ̃i)(1− ζ)(Rei,t +Rdi,t), (3.38)





In this formula, NPII and TI denote the non permissible income including interest and
total income. We retrieve the NPII and TI historical data from the company’s financial
statement, and calculate the average NPII/TI to get the constant purification percentage
ψ̃i. In this simulation we set the zakat rate ζ = 0. Based on the empirical data that we have
retrieved from the ASII quarterly financial statements from 2013 to 2018, we find ψ̃1 =
0.23619. As we can see in Figure 3.2, the purified return data with constant purification
proposed by Hazny et al. (2020) and Derbali et al. (2017) have higher values than the
return data without purification when the non purified return data is negative. With a





which will result in a negative value when Ret + R
d
t is negative. However, in reality the
amount of purification is never negative, so the purified asset return is always less than
or equal to the non purified return. To deal with this problem, we modify the constant
purified return by
Rp4i,t = (1− ψ̃i)(1− ζ) max(Rei,t +Rdi,t, 0). (3.40)
In equation (3.40), we assume that the purification will be processed only if investors get
a positive return.
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Figure 3.2: ASII empirical quarterly return data without purification and with several
types purification from 2013-2018
We conduct a Jarque Berra test to check normality of returns and purified returns.
The p-values at the 5% significant level from the J-B tests are reported in Table 3.1. We
denoted ASII excess return data as Rp01,t, and the purified return data as R
ps
1,t, with s = 1 for
dividend purification return, s = 2 for investment purification return, s = 3 for constant
purification return, and s = 4 for modified constant return. Based on Table (3.1), the
test indicates that ASII return and purified return data are consistent (at 5% significance
level) with the null hypothesis of the skewness and kurtosis matching a normal distribution.
Additional evidence based on histogram and QQ-plots (see Appendix C.1) also support
the normality assumption on modeling these excess return and purified return data. The
sample mean and sample standard deviation of ASII return and purified return data are in
Table 3.2. Other input parameters needed in the simulation study are given in Table 3.3.











p-value 0.3495 0.3452 0.3309 0.3495 0.2685
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µps1 0.02778 0.02605 0.01623 0.02122 0.01393
σps1 0.10372 0.10295 0.10384 0.07932 0.08997
Table 3.3: Input parameters for Shariah portfolio consisting 1 risky asset and 2 risky assets
Parameter R0 T W0 M n
Value 1.01 5 (years) 1 20 50000
In this simulation we also assume no short selling and no leverage constraints, that is
x ∈ [0, 1]. (3.41)
Figure 3.3 shows the efficient frontiers for the un-constrained conventional portfolio,
constrained conventional portfolio, and constrained Shariah portfolio with 4 types of pu-
rification. Adding shortselling and leverage constraints to the conventional portfolio pro-
duce a lower efficient frontier. This result is to be expected because the optimal solution is
restricted to the constraints (3.41). Incorporating a purification process to the constrained
portfolio reduces the total return of the portfolio, and hence it produces a lower efficient
frontier. The Shariah portfolio with the dividend type purification yields a better perfor-
mance than the investment purification. This result is consistent with Figure 3.2 showing
that the dividend purified return is always higher than the investment purified return.
Because the dividend purification only occurs when the company issues dividend and only
applies to the dividend, it is expected that Shariah portfolio with the dividend purification
yields a better performance when compared with the investment purification.
The efficient frontier from the Shariah portfolio with constant purification proposed
by Hazny et al. (2020) and Derbali et al. (2017) lies between the Shariah portfolio with
dividend and investment types purification. The modified version of constant purification
yields the worst performance among other type of purification. Both constant and modified
constant purification are carried out regardless whether or not the dividend is issued, and
it applies to the total return (capital gain and dividend). This process is similar to the
investment purification. The difference is in the calculation methods: while the investment
purification is the percentage of NPI to the total outsanding share (see Equation (2.1)), the
constant purification is the percentage of NPI to TI (see Equation (3.39)). The negative
values of purification rate from Hazny et al. (2020) and Derbali et al. (2017) contribute
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to a higher efficient frontier compared to the corresponding modification purification. Our
proposed investment purification has a better performance than the constant modified
purification, although the last type of purification only applies when the return is positive.
Hence, if the purification should be applied to both capital appreciation and dividend yield,
then our proposed investment purification is a better option for this case.
Figure 3.3: Efficient frontiers for conventional portfolio, conventional portfolio with con-
straint, and Shariah portfolio with four purification types without screening
Incorporating Purification, shortselling and leverage restrictions, and Shariah
screening constraints
In this section, in addition to purification and constraint as formulated in (3.41), we incor-
porate screening constraints to construct a Shariah portfolio efficient frontier. We apply
two different modeling assumptions of financial ratios, namely a beta distribution and a
beta-AR(1) distribution. The parameters are estimated based on empirical data of the
ASII financial ratios from 2013 to 2018 that we have retrieved from its quarterly financial
statements. In our simulation, we use the Total Asset divisor to calculate financial ratios.
The historical ASII financial ratios are depicted in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: ASII empirical quarterly return data without purification and with several
types purification from 2013-2018
For the Beta distribution assumption, we assume that Fj1,t ∼ Beta(αBj1, βBj1). We apply
a betafit function and adtest function in Matlab software to estimate the parameters and
calculate p-values from the Anderson-Darling test. The estimated parameters, and the
corresponding p-values, are reported in Table 3.4. The Anderson-Darling test indicates
that all ASII financial ratios are consistent with the null hypothesis (at 5% significance
level) that the data follows a beta distribution with estimated parameter αBj1 and β
B
j1.
Financial ratio F11,t F21,t F31,t F41,t
αBj1 179.6034 53.0245 402.9962 4.9817
βBj1 489.4 472.6 1787.7 295.2
p-value 0.8597 0.3776 0.8801 0.1245
Table 3.4: Beta distribution estimated parameters and p-values from ASII financial ratios
data
For time-dependent model, we assume that the j-th financial ratio follows a beta-AR(1)
model described in subsection 3.1.1 with estimated parameters αAj1, β
A1
j1 , and δj1. We apply
a method of moments as described in Algorithm 1 of Appendix C.2 to be an initial guess of
the maximum likelihood parameters of the beta-AR(1). Then, we use fminsearch function
55






where S is the sample size, and `t(πji,t, δji) is the logarithm of the likelihood function of
beta-AR(1):
`t(πji,t, δji) = log Γ(δji)− log Γ(δjiπji,t)− log Γ(δji(1− πji,t)) + (πji,tδji − 1) logFji,t
+
[








1− exp(αAji + βA1ji g(Fji,t−∆t))
.
Table 3.5 presents Beta-AR(1) estimated parameters for ASII financial ratios. Fig-
ure 3.5 depicts one path of the beta-AR(1) simulated financial ratios along with the histor-
ical data. These historical data are the same as those in Figures 3.4. These figures show
qualitatively that the beta-AR(1) model captures reasonably well the dynamic of the data.
The diagnostic in Appendix C.3 shows that the residuals scatter around a zero horizontal
level have no trend. Furthermore, Figure C.7 does not show statistically significant evi-
dence of nonzero autocorrelation in the residuals. Hence, we can conclude that beta-AR(1)
is a good model for ASII financial ratios.
Financial ratio αAj1 β
A1
j1 δj1
F11,t -0.5377 0.4729 942.3916
F21,t -0.7897 0.6329 898.9128
F31,t -1.2 0.2 4194
F41,t -2.098 0.4848 368.8105
Table 3.5: ASII Financial ratio beta-AR(1) estimated parameters
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(a) Leverage ratio (b) Cash ratio
(c) Liquidity ratio (d) NPI ratio
Figure 3.5: Beta-AR ASII financial ratio
In our study we also use the following permissible boundary:
Uj =
{
0.3, for j = 1, 2, 3
0.1, for j = 4.
(3.43)
The initial financial ratios are taken to be the values at the end of 2018, which gives
F11,0 = 0.2469, F21,0 = 0.111, F31,0 = 0.2042, and F41,0 = 0.0165
In addition to constraint (3.41), we also incorporate the asset level screening con-
straint (3.10), portfolio level screening constraint (3.13), and both the asset level screening
and the asset level probabilistic constraints ( (3.10) and (3.14) with α = 0.05) to solve the
Shariah portfolio problem with dividend-type purification. The respective efficient frontiers
are depicted in the upper panel in Figure 3.6 for the beta distribution model, and the lower
panel, for beta-AR(1) model. The non-screening efficient frontier, i.e. without imposing
the Shariah screening constraints, is also plotted in Figure 3.6 to benchmark against the
case with screening. This efficient frontier corresponds to the dividend purification efficient
frontier in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.6: The impact of screening constraints on the multiperiod Shariah portfolio effi-
cient frontier. Upper panel is based on the beta distribution model while the lower panel
is based on the beta-AR(1) model.
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(a) Beta distribution with γ = 4 (b) Beta distribution with γ = 18
(c) Beta-AR(1) with γ = 4 (d) Beta-AR(1) with γ = 18
Figure 3.7: One sample asset allocations with screening constraints at γ = 4 and γ = 18
along with beta distribution and beta-AR(1) financial ratios
The impact of screening constraints in the multiperiod Shariah portfolio optimization
problem are depicted in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, with the following key observations:
• Figure 3.6 shows that the impact of screening in the multiperiod Shariah portfolio
with short-selling and leverage restrictions is consistent with the results found by
Derigs and Marzban (2009), namely that the asset level screening has a better per-
formance than the portfolio level screening. This result is reasonable since the asset
level screening has a stricter rule than the portfolio level screening, in the sense that
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at the asset screening level once one of the financial ratios exceeds its permissible
boundary, then the asset is excluded from the investment portfolio. Under the port-
folio level screening, the risky asset is still admissible, however its asset allocation is
reduced to maintain the requirement that the total amount of financial ratio is lower
than the permissible boundary (i.e. xi,tFji,t < Uj).
• Figure 3.7 shows the impact of screening constraints on the asset allocation dis-
tribution. The figure presents one sample of a set of financial ratios from the beta
distribution and the beta-AR(1) model, along with the optimal asset allocations with
two different inputs of γ. We set two different values of γ to assess the distribution of
asset allocations in two different points of the efficient frontier. γ = 4 produces a low
risk and low return portfolio (the right tail of the efficient frontiers), while γ = 18
produces a high risk and high return portfolio (the left tail of the efficient frontiers).
Key observations from Figure 3.7 in terms of the performance of Shariah portfolio
with the asset and portfolio level screening constraints are :
(i) When the leverage ratio crosses the permissible boundary at times t = 8 and 18
for the beta distribution and at time t = 8 for the beta-AR(1) model, then the
asset allocation is reduced to zero for the asset level screening constraints. This
asset allocation is re-distributed to the non-risky asset that has a lower risk and
lower return, hence it produces a lower risk and lower return portfolio
(ii) In terms of the portfolio level screening, the asset allocation is slightly reduced,
for example, from 100% without screening to 94.4% with screening at time t = 8
in the case of beta distribution model with γ = 18. Because the change of asset
allocations is not significant in terms of the portfolio level screening, the efficient
frontier of the Shariah portfolio with the portfolio level screening constraint is
closer to the Shariah portfolio without screening constraint.
• Imposing probabilistic asset screening in addition to the screening constraint leads to
a significant change in the asset allocation, from positive weights (with no screening or
screening constraint only) to zero, as confirmed in Figure 3.3. The dramatic change of
the asset allocation produces the lowest efficient frontiers in Figure 3.3. The change
of the efficient frontier for the Beta distribution model is even more pronounced.
Even though the leverage ratio sample from the Beta-AR(1) model only crosses the
permissible boundary 1 time, these values are consistently high and very close to the
permissible boundary during time period 5 to 10, and at time t = 15, 18. Hence,
to keep the risk of non-compliance at an acceptable level, the asset allocations are
reduced to zero during these time periods. This probabilistic constraint is effective
in maintaining the sustainability of the portfolio in terms of Shariah compliance.
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3.3.3 Shariah Compliant Portfolio with 2 Risky Assets and 1
Risk-free Asset
In this subsection, we expand the problem by solving the optimal Shariah portfolio con-
sisting of 2 risky assets and 1 risk-free asset. We have estimated the parameters of the
risky assets’ purified returns and financial ratios from ASII.JK and TLKM.JK quarterly
historical data spanning the time period from 2013 to 2018.
Incorporating purification and restriction to shortselling and leverage facility
We use the same input parameters for ASII purified return data Rps1,t as those presented
in Table 3.2. Now we present the estimated parameters for TLKM return and purified
return data. We use the same approach for calculating 4 types of purifications for ASII as
in subsection 3.3.2. In our discussion, we use the following notation of the TLKM return
data at time t:
• Rp02,t denotes the excess capital appreciation plus dividend yield.
• Rp12,t denotes purified excess return with dividend type purification.
• Rp22,t denotes purified excess return with investment type purification.
• Rp32,t denotes purified excess return with constant purification model.
• Rp42,t denotes purified excess return with modified constant purification model.
To calculate the constant purification and modified constant purification, we use a
constant NPI percentage ψ̃2 = 0.0524, which we have calculated as the average of the NPI
percentage from 2013 to 2018. Figure 3.8 presents the TLKM historical returns from 2013
to 2018. When a non-purified return is negative, the constant purified return is higher
than the return without purification. The investment purified return is always lower than
the dividend purified return, since the deduction from the investment purification is always
higher than the dividend purification, as depicted in Figure 2.1.
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(a) Rps2,t quarterly data from 2013 to 2018 (b) magnified R
ps
2,t data
Figure 3.8: TLKM empirical quarterly return data without purification and with several
types purification from 2013 to 2018
We assume that for each s, s = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, the returns Rps2,t, t = ∆t, 2∆t, . . . , T , are
independent and follow a normal distribution with mean µps2 and volatility σ
ps
2 . The es-
timated means and standard deviations, along with the p-values from the J-B tests, are
presented in Table 3.6. The results in Table 3.6 indicate that TLKM return and puri-
fied returns data are consistent with the null hypothesis of the Jarque-Bera test (at 5%
significance level) the skewness being zero and the excess kurtosis being zero. Additional
evidence based on histograms and QQ-plots (see Appendix C.1) also support the normality
assumption in modeling these excess return and purified return data.











µps2 0.05184 0.04951 0.05245 0.04971 0.04861
σps2 0.11716 0.11707 0.11731 0.11115 0.11253
p-value 0.311 0.3174 0.3124 0.3124 0.3614
In addition to mean and volatility, we also estimate correlations between ASII and
TLKM return and purified returns data, which are given in Table 3.7. Other input param-
eters required to find the solution of the Shariah portfolio problem consisting of 2 risky
assets and 1 risky asset are the same as in Table 3.3.
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0.43623 0.43696 0.43523 0.43623 0.43113
In this study, we consider 2 different cases. In Case 1, we impose a no-short selling
restriction, and the upper limit constraint for each asset is 1. The portfolio constraint for
Case 1 are given in (3.44). In Case 2, we add a no-leverage constraint in addition to the
no-short selling constraint, which are presented in (3.45).
Case 1 constraint:
0 ≤ xi,t ≤ 1, for i = 1, 2, and t = 0, 1, . . . T −∆t. (3.44)
Case 2 constraint:
0 ≤ xi,t ≤ 1, for i = 1, 2, and t = 0, 1, . . . T −∆t∑N
i=1 xi,t ≤ 1, for t = 0, 1, . . . T −∆t.
}
(3.45)
Figure 3.9 shows efficient frontiers for the un-constrained conventional portfolio, the
conventional portfolio with constraint (3.44), and the Shariah portfolios with constraint (3.44).
As we can see from the graph, adding shortselling constraints to the conventional portfolio
produces a lower efficient frontier. This result is expected because the optimal asset allo-
cations for the risky assets are restricted to the region in constraint (3.44). The presence
of a purification process penalizes the risk and reward tradeoff, as depicted by the lower
efficient frontiers for both dividend and investment purification. The Shariah portfolio with
a dividend type purification yields better performance than the investment purification.
This result is consistent with Figures 3.2 and 3.8, which shows that the dividend purified
return is always higher than the investment purified return. Because the dividend purifica-
tion only occurs when the company issues dividend, and only applies to the dividend, it is
expected that Shariah portfolio with dividend purification will yield a better performance
compared to the investment purification.
The efficient frontier from the Shariah portfolio with constant purification proposed by
Hazny et al. (2020) and Derbali et al. (2017) lies between the Shariah portfolio with divi-
dend and the Shariah portfolio with the investment type purification for high risk portfolio,
however its values outperform the conventional counterpart for the low risk portfolio. This
phenomenon happen due to the negative values of purification rate under the constant
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purification model. The modified version of the constant purification yields the worst per-
formance among the other types of purification for high risk portfolio, both constant and
modified constant purifications are carried out regardless whether or not the dividend is
being issued, and it applies to the total return (capital gain and dividend). This process is
similar to the investment purification. The difference is in the calculation method: while
the investment purification is the percentage of NPI to the total outstanding share (see
Equation (2.1)), the constant purification is the percentage of NPI to TI (see Equation
(3.38)). The negative values of purification rate from Hazny et al. (2020) and Derbali
et al. (2017) contribute to a higher efficient frontier compared to the corresponding modi-
fication purification. Our proposed investment purification (Equation (2.1)) shows better
performance than the constant modified purification for high risk portfolio, although the
last type of purification only applies when the return is positive. Hence, if the purifica-
tion should be applied to both the capital appreciation and the dividend yield, then our
proposed investment purification is a better option for this case.
(a) Efficient frontiers for purified return (b) Magnified efficient frontiers
Figure 3.9: Efficient frontiers of portfolio consisting of 2 risky assets and 1 risk-free asset
for conventional portfolio, constrained conventional portfolio, and Shariah portfolio with 4
types purifications and with Case 1 constraint.
To see the impact of the leverage constraint on the portfolio, we generate the efficient
frontier for the Shariah portfolio with dividend purification and Case 2 (no-short sell and
no-leverage) constraints. The result is depicted in Figure 3.10. To compare results, in the
same graph we also present the efficient frontier of the Shariah portfolio with the dividend
purification and Case 1 (no-short sell) constraint. The presence of the leverage constraint
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penalizes the risk and return of the portfolio, and the decline is more pronounced for the
high risk and high return portfolios.
Figure 3.10: Efficient frontiers of Shariah portfolio with dividend purification consisting of
2 risky assets and 1 risky asset for Case 1 and Case 2 constraints.
Incorporating Purification, shortselling and leverage restrictions, and Shariah
screening constraints
In this subsection, we add several screening constraints to Case 1 and Case 2 constraints.
In Figure 3.11 we present historical data from 2013 to 2018 of the quarterly financial ratio
screening for TLKM. The NPI ratio of TLKM is zero between 2013 to 2018, hence we only
provide three other financial ratio data.
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Figure 3.11: TLKM empirical quarterly financial ratio data from 2013-2018
In the portfolio with 2 risky assets and 1 risky-free asset, we only model the dynamic
of financial ratios using the beta-AR(1) model. The estimated parameters for ASII are
given in Table 3.5, while the estimated parameters for TLKM are presented in Table 3.8.
Figure 3.12 depicts one simulated path of TLKM financial ratio using the beta-AR(1)
model. The analysis of residuals from the fitted model in Appendix C.3 suggests that the
residuals have nearly the properties of white noise. Hence, we can conclude that beta-
AR(1) with the estimated parameters in Table 3.5 are reasonably close to the true values
of TLKM financial ratios.
Financial ratio αAj2 β
A1
j2 δj2
F12,t -0.8185 0.4214 259.8788
F22,t -1.2978 0.2933 113.107
F32,t -1.2149 0.1258 224.6933
Table 3.8: TLKM Financial ratio beta-AR(1) estimated parameters
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(a) Leverage ratio (b) Cash ratio
(c) Liquidity ratio
Figure 3.12: Beta-AR TLKM financial ratio
In this simulation, we have adopted the same assumption of permissible boundary
as the one given by Equation (3.43). The initial values of the TLKM financial ratios
Fj2,0 are taken to be the values at the end of 2018, which gives F12,0 = 0.2296, F22,0 =
0.0677, and F32,0 = 0.1546. We impose asset level screening constraint (3.10) and portfolio
level screening constraint (3.13) to find the optimal solution for dividend purified Shariah
portfolio with Case 1 and Case 2 constraint. The solutions of the Shariah portfolio problem
for γ ∈ [2, 18] are plotted in Figure 3.13. In Case 2, where leverage facility is not allowed,
the portfolio level screening is better than the asset level screening in terms of its risk and
return tradeoff. This result is consistent with the finding of Derigs and Marzban (2009)
and our finding in Section 3.3.2, for one period Shariah portfolio consisting of risky assets
only, and the finding in Section 2.4.2, for multiperiod Shariah portfolio with 1 risky asset
and 1 risk-free asset. Table 3.9 provides the means and standard deviations of efficient
frontiers in Figure 3.13 (b). The efficient frontier of the Shariah portfolio with the asset
level screening constraint is slightly lower than the one with the portfolio level screening
constraint. As we can see from Table 3.9, when the volatility level is equal to 1.5937,
the mean of the Shariah portfolio with the asset level screening constraint is 3.2770, while
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the mean of the Shariah portfolio with the portfolio level screening constraint is 3.2773.
We found interesting phenomenon in case 1 efficient frontiers: when leverage facility is
allowed, the efficient frontier for Shariah portfolio with the asset level screening constraint
outperform Shariah portfolio with the portfolio level screening constraint. The change of
the efficient frontiers is caused by the redistribution of the asset allocations in order to
fulfill the screening and leverage constraints which is depicted in Figure 3.14.
(a) Case 1 constraint (b) Case 2 constraint
Figure 3.13: Shariah portfolio efficient frontiers with dividend purification with several
Shariah screening constraints for no-shortselling case (a) and no shortselling and no-
leverage case (b).
No screening Asset-screening Portfolio-screening
Std[WT ] E[WT ] Std[WT ] E[WT ] Std[WT ] E[WT ]
0 1.2202 0 1.2202 0 1.2202
0.2216 1.9165 0.2132 1.9193 0.2129 1.9194
0.9488 2.907 0.9422 2.8999 0.9417 2.9003
1.4016 3.2109 1.3908 3.1936 1.3903 3.1938
1.6018 3.2952 1.5937 3.277 1.5936 3.2773
1.6521 3.3106 1.6417 3.2917 1.6418 3.2921
Table 3.9: Optimal means and standard deviations of Shariah portfolios with several screen-
ing constraints and Case 2 constraint.
Figure 3.14 represents a simulated sample of financial ratios for ASII and TLKM, and
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the corresponding optimal asset allocations with screening constraints when γ = 18 (right-
end point of the efficient frontiers in Figure 3.13). For Case 1 with asset level screening,
once the leverage ratio of ASII exceeds the 30% permissible boundary at time t = 4 and
t = 8, then x1,t is equal to zero. Similarly, when the liquidity ratio of TLKM reach 30.19%
at time t = 12, then x2,t is equal to zero. The weights of these risky assets are re-distributed
to the non-risky asset, which has lower return and lower risk. This redistribution leads to
a lower level of frontier.
In Case 1, when the leverage facility is allowed, the optimal asset allocations without
screening constraint are: buying ASII and TLKM as much as 100% of wealth for each
assets, and borrowing 100% from the money market. When we add asset level screening
constraint in Case 1 problem then we get similar optimal asset allocations as the ones with-
out screening constraint except when the screening ratios exceed the boundary. However,
when the portfolio level screening is applied, then the asset allocation for ASII are reduced
to maintain the total of financial ratio from ASII and TLKM to be less than the permissible
boundary. For example, at time t = 0, the optimal asset allocations are: buying 100% of
TLKM (which has the highest return among other assets), buying 28.51% of ASII, and
selling 28.51% of risk-free asset so that x1,0F11,0 + x2,0F12,0 = 0.3. This results explain the
phenomenon that the efficient frontier of Shariah portfolio with the asset level screening
constraint may outperform Shariah portfolio with the portfolio level screening constraint.
When the leverage facility is restricted (Case 2), then the optimal asset allocation
without screening constraint is equivalent to buying 100% of wealth in TLKM. TLKM is
chosen because it has the highest return and highest volatility among other assets, so that
the highest return and highest volatility of portfolios (at γ = 18) is achieved. When the
asset level screening constraint is processed, then TLKM is no longer acceptable at t = 12.
In this case, the weight is re-distributed to ASII that has a higher return than the risk-free
asset. If the portfolio level screening is applied to the Shariah portfolio, TLKM is still
an admissible asset at t = 10, however the weight is reduced to 99%. The insignificant
change of these optimal asset allocations causes the difference in efficient frontiers to be
less conspicuous.
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(a) ASII Case 1 (b) TLKM Case 1
(c) ASII Case 2 (d) TLKM Case 2
Figure 3.14: A simulated sample of asset allocations of ASII and TLKM with screening
constraints for Case 1 and Case 2
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have extended the Shariah compliant portfolio model with purification
and screening process discussed in Section 2 to a multi-period setting. We assume that the
portfolio consist of 1 risk-free asset and N risky assets with their purified excess returns
following geometric Brownian motions. We conduct 4 types of purification, namely divi-
dend purification, investment purification, constant purification proposed by Derbali et al.
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(2017) and Hazny et al. (2020), and the modified constant purification. We propose the
modified version of Hazny et al. (2020) and Derbali et al. (2017) to address the negative
values of purification in the existing model.
We solve the optimal multiperiod Shariah portfolio allocation problem by re-formulating
the problem into a tractable LQ problem, solution of which is called the pre-commitment
strategy. The advantage of this approach is that the Bellman dynamic programming prin-
ciple is applicable, and hence a common backward recursive method can be applied to solve
this optimization problem.
After constructing the portfolio problem, we introduce several Shariah constraints,
namely no-shortselling, leverage restriction, and several screening constraints. For the
screening process, we apply two assumptions to capture the temporal dynamics of the
financial screening ratio: the independence assumption with a Beta distribution and the
dependence assumption with a Beta-ARMA model. We have also incorporated the im-
portant non-compliance probabilistic constraint, which we have found to be efficient in
maintaining the sustainability of an asset in the portfolio.
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Chapter 4
Discrete Time Ruin Probability for
Takaful (Islamic Insurance) with
Investment and Qard-Hasan
(Benevolent Loan) Activities
The contents of this chapter are adapted from a published paper titled ”Discrete Time Ruin
Probability for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) with Investment and Qard-Hasan (Benevolent
Loan) Activities” by Puspita et al. (2020). This Chapter discusses the construction formula
to calculate the finite-time ruin probability for Takaful, with the following contributions:
• We propose a risk model incorporating qard-hasan (benevolent loan) facility and
mudarabah (profit-sharing) payment which are the unique and prominent features in
Takaful business product.
• We construct a recursive formula to calculate a finite-time ruin probability for the
proposed Takaful risk model. In constructing the formula, we follow the idea of
Kim and Drekic (2016) by calculating the conditional survival probability of the
first claim occurrence recursively. While the authors construct the formula for a
conventional insurance product which considers interest loan and investment activity
with a constant return, we construct the model with the unique Takaful features of
qard-hasan and investment based mudarabah with stochastic return model.
• We also conduct numerical simulations to study the sensitivity of several prominent
features in Takaful.
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4.1 Hybrid (Mixed) Takaful Insurance Business Model
with Qard-Hasan Facility
The Hybrid, or mixed, model is the most dominant model in the Takaful market, which
can be explained by the fact that The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) recommends the practice of this model. In this model,
a Wakalah (agent-based) contract is used for underwriting activities, while a Mudarabah
(profit sharing) contract is adopted for investment activities. Based on the study conducted
by Khan (2015) and Khan (2019), Hybrid Takaful model serves as the optimal structure
for Takaful operation. In this study, we focus only on the Hybrid Takaful contract.
In regard to the underwriting activities, the Takaful operator acts as a Wakeel (agent) on
behalf of participants to manage the Takaful fund. As shown in Figure (4.1), the operator
manages the Takaful fund and pays all of the incurred expenses to the participants. In
exchange for these tasks, the company charges each participant a predefined fee known as
a Wakalah fee. This fee is deducted initially and goes to the shareholders’ fund.
The Hybrid Takaful model applies the Mudarabah contract (profit-sharing basis) for the
investment activities. The operator manages the assets and shares the income generated
from the investment based on a predetermined profit share ratio. In this contract, the
operator, as a fund manager or mudarib, will receive profit depending on the performance
of the investment.
The income generated from an investment, after the deduction by mudarib’s fee for
the operator in conjunction with underwriting surplus, represents the surplus in Takaful
(participants’) fund. All of the surplus accounts are property of the Takaful participants.
However, Takaful operator may receive an additional fee in case of a positive surplus
in Takaful fund, which is called incentive or performance fee. This fee is determined as a
percentage of the surplus generated in the Takaful fund. The remaining profit is distributed
to the participants.
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Figure 4.1: Hybrid Takaful Model. Source: Tolefat and Asutay Tolefat and Asutay (2013)
pp. 39
In the case of a negative surplus in the Takaful fund, two options are usually considered.
The first option is to charge the participants with additional contributions to cover the
deficit value. However, this practice is not popular as it is not commercially feasible (Tolefat
and Asutay, 2013). The second option, qard-hasan facility, is not only more popular in
practice, but a mandatory requirement by some regulatory authorities and encouraged by
the Islamic Financial Shariah Board (IFSB, 2010). Hence, in our model, we focus only on
the qard-hasan option to overcome a deficit situation.
Qard-hasan, often called the benevolent loan, is an interest-free loan facility that is
provided by shareholders as short term solvency resources to participants’ funds in case of
a deficit. Qard-hasan is a part of the shareholders’ capital that is specially earmarked to
maintain the solvency of participants’ fund. According to the IFSB (2010) regulation, any
drawn down qard-hasan need to be repaid out of the of future surpluses of participants’
fund. In the event when the borrower is unable to settle the loan, the lender cannot force
the borrower to make a repayment, and they must accept this transaction as a charitable
act. Most Islamic scholars, including Onagun (2011); Yusof et al. (2011); Tolefat and
Asutay (2013), and Rahim et al. (2017) agree with these IFSB (2010)’s rules in relation to
the treatment of qard-hasan facility.
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4.2 Surplus Process for Hybrid Takaful with Invest-
ment and Qard-Hassan facility
In this section, we propose a surplus model for Hybrid Takaful with investment activities
and qard-hasan (non-interest loan) facility, which we use in the next section to evaluate
the corresponding ruin probability. The model is inspired by Kim and Drekic (2016), who
consider a discrete-time dependent Sparre Andersen risk model in the context of conven-
tional insurance. The first difference between our approach and the one by Kim and Drekic
(2016) is in the loan fund feature. In our model, there is no interest in undertaking loans,
as in the conventional model. The second difference is in the loan repayment arrangement.
While in the model proposed by Kim and Drekic (2016) the borrower is forced to pay the
loan undertaking (including interest) when it exceeds a certain level (i.e. loan capacity),
in our model the borrower will repay the loan only if they generate a positive surplus in
the future. However, the lender has a right to get a part of each shared underwriting divi-
dend to compensate for their effort to provide a benevolent loan. The third difference is in
our assumption that the undrawn-down loan can be invested. We should note that Achlak
(2016) has also developed a Takaful risk model based on Kim and Drekic (2016) paper with
the assumption that the loan facility does not need to be repaid and can not be invested.
In our study, we assume that the loan facility (i.e. qard-hasan facility) will be repaid from
the future surplus, and the undrawn-down qard-hasan facility will be invested to enhance
the facility. Finally, our model provides the option to invest in a risk-free or risky asset
with a stochastic return, and takes into account Mudharabah or fund management fee for
operator from each generating investment return.
In our Hybrid Takaful risk model, we incorporate the following four separate financial
accounts:
U : surplus fund
F I : investment fund
FQ: qard-hasan fund
FL: liability account
and three thresholds levels:
lW : the minimal requirement of Takaful surplus level
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lI : trigger level for investment activities
lD: trigger level for dividend payment
which satisfies 0 ≤ lW ≤ lI ≤ lD.
We have explained in Chapter 4.1 that there are two separate financial accounts in
Takaful, namely participants’ funds and shareholders’ funds. The participants’ fund in
our model are sub-divided into two separate financial accounts, namely, surplus fund U
and investment fund F I . The reason for the separation of both accounts is for better
financial management, while the underwriting activities are represented in the surplus
fund U , the financial activities are in the investment fund F I . The qard-hasan fund is part
of shareholders’ fund that is specially allocated as a benevolent loan for participants in
case of deficit which occurs due to underwriting activities. In our model, the drawn-down
qard-hasan need to be repaid from future surplus of participants’ fund. We introduce the
liability account FL to keep track of the total of qard-hasan borrowed and refunded. In
our model we assume that all funds are in discrete monetary accounts. This assumption is





t , and F
L
t we denote the value of surplus level, the investment fund, the
qard-hasan fund, and the liability account, respectively, at the end of the time interval (t−
1, t], t ∈ Z+ (where Z+ = {1, 2, ...}). We assume that a constant contribution (premium) of
b ∈ Z+ is received at (t−1)+, while claims are applied at t−. We also define Ut−, F It−, F
Q
t−,
and FLt− as the participants’ surplus fund, investment fund, qard-hasan facility, and liability,
respectively, immediately after a claim instance but before a withdrawal, borrowing, qard-
hasan undertaking, and qard-hasan repayment instance.
A dividend trigger level lD is a threshold that determines the dividend payment scenario.
If Ut ≥ lD a dividend amount of δit, i = {1, 2} from the underwriting surplus will be
shared among participants and shareholders. In our model, we propose two options for the
dividend value. In the first one for δ1t , we assume a constant dividend, while in the second
for δ2t we use a similar assumption to that adopted by Achlak (2016), namely, that the
dividend is equal to Ut − lD. We assume that the percentage of the dividends distributed
to the participants and to the shareholders are given by x and 1 − x. respectively, where
x ∈ (0, 1).
We define Pt as the contribution received at time t and D
S
t as the total dividend
distributed to shareholders at time t. Thus,
Pt =
{
b, if Ut < l
D





0, if Ut < l
D
(1− x)δit, if Ut ≥ lD
(4.2)
where δ1t = δ ≤ b, δ ∈ Z+ and δ2t = Ut − lD.
A threshold lI is a trigger point for investment activities. If Ut ≥ lI a constant amount
d ∈ Z+ is re-distributed to the investment fund at time t+. We assume that investment
activities at each time interval are carried out after all of the outstanding debts and claims
have been paid out. We denote the deposit amount corresponding to the time interval
(t, t+ 1] as DIt , thus
DIt =
{
0, if Ut < l
I
d, if Ut ≥ lI .
(4.3)
Note that from equations (4.2) and (4.3), if Ut > l
D, then both DSt and D
I
t are paid.
We also assume that the operator, as a fund manager, may invest in the Shariah
(permissible) non-risky or risky assets, like sukuk (Islamic bond) or a Shariah stock. In
Takaful, the operator acts as a fund manager as well. Hence, they have the right to
get ”salary” from participants’ funds due to this role. A Hybrid Takaful model applies
Mudarabah (profit-share) for an investment activity in which it receives a dividend payment
from investment generated profit. We assume that the fund manager receives y ∈ (0, 1)
part of an investment gain.
Threshold lW represents the minimum level of the acceptable surplus of the participants’
fund. If Ut− drops, at some time between t−1 and t, below lW due to claims, we withdraw
from F I , or borrow from FQ, to bring the surplus fund up to level lW at time t. Withdrawal
from the investment account F I is utilized first. We consider undertaking a interest-free
loan from qard-hasan facility if the investment fund F It− is not sufficient to bring the
surplus level back to lW . The maximum qard-hasan that can be drawn down at time t is
the maximum value of FQt or the remaining money needed by Ut to reach l
W , whichever is
smaller. The process will continue as long as the surplus-value is not negative. We assume
that the un-drawn down qard-hasan fund will be invested in a risky or non-risky asset. The
un-drawn down and investment gains will remain in the qard-hasan account to strengthen
its facility. We denote the withdrawals and the qard-hasan undertaking amounts occurring





0, if Ut− ≥ lW





0, if Ut− ≥ lW
min{FQt−,max{0, (lW − Ut− − F It−)}}, if Ut− < lW .
(4.5)
Participants need to repay their total qard-hasan undertaking to the qard-hasan fund
FQ in the future period when their surplus value is greater than lW . We assume that the
loan repayment will be paid instantly after the claim is paid out at t−. If the surplus-value
after claim payout at t− is greater than lW , then the loan will be repaid at t−. The loan
repayment amount should not make the surplus-value drop below lW in any period. Unlike
in the conventional counterpart, in the case when participants are not able to repay the
qard-hasan, the undertaking qard-hasan will be counted as charity from shareholders to
the participant. The participants are not to obligated to repay the loan in case of a deficit.
So, in our model, the loan repayment will not be the reason for ruin, but it will affect the
value of Ut and F
Q
t instead. We define D
Q
t as the qard-hasan repayment corresponding to
the time interval (t− 1, t]. Thus, we have
DQt =
{
0, if Ut− ≤ lW
min{FLt−, (Ut− − lW )}, if Ut− > lW .
(4.6)
for calculation purpose, We identify the total liability of the participants’ fund up to
time t. Let us recall that FLt as the total liability at time t, and F
L
t− as the liability
before qard-hasan undertaking and qard-hasan repayment. This account records only the








Finally, the surplus level at time t is the initial level of u plus the total cash inflows
from: contributions, withdrawal from investment fund, and loan undertaking from qard-
hasan facility, minus the total cash outflows to: deposit investment, qard-hasan repayment,























where Nt represents the number of claims occurred by time t and Xi is the claim severity,
represents the size of an individual claim. We assume that the claim distribution of Nt
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and Xt has the same structure as in Sparre Andersen models Cheung et al. (2010). We
also assume that the time between claims (i− 1) and i, i ∈ Z+, are defined by iid positive
random variables {Wi, i ∈ Z+} with a define pmf ak and a corresponding survival function
of Ak:
ak = Pr{Wi = k}, k = 1, 2, ..., na, (4.9)
where na ∈ Z+ represents the upper bound for the interclaim times. Thus, for k ≤ na, we
have




We denote by αj(k) the conditional probability mass function (pmf) of Xi given Wi = k:
αj(k) = Pr{Xi = j|Wi = k}, j ∈ Z+. (4.11)
We assume that the pairs {(Wi, Xi), i ∈ Z+} are iid, so that the joint pmf of (Wi, Xi) is of
the form
Pr{Wi = k,Xi = j} = akαj(k). (4.12)
In order to visualize the above descriptions of the money flow, below we present an
illustrative example of the evolution of surplus fund, investment fund, qard-hasan facility
fund, and the liability level given by Figures (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5), respectively. The
surplus fund starts from an initial level u, and the maximum capacity of the qard-hasan
facility that is provided by shareholders at the initial point is fQ. The investment fund
and the liability level are zero at the initial period. In each period, at time (t− 1)+ there
is contribution income deducted by deposit from investment fund and dividend payment
if the corresponding trigger points are reached at time t. If surplus drops below the level
lW due to claim payments at t−, we withdraw from the investment fund and/or qard-
hasan facility. Every qard-hasan undertaking and repayment activities are recorded in the
liability fund.
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Figure 4.2: Example of a realization of the participants’s fund process (Ut)
Figure 4.3: Example of a realization of the investment fund process (F It )
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Figure 4.4: Example of a realization of the qard-hasan fund process (FQt )
Figure 4.5: Example of a realization of the liability account process (FLt )
4.3 Finite-Time Ruin Probability for Hybrid-Takaful
This section describes a method of calculating a finite-time ruin probability associated with
the Takaful risk model described by equation (4.8). In particular, our goal is to derive the
probability of ruin occurring before time τ <∞, which we denote by Ψ(v, gI , gQ, gL, τ):
Ψ(v, gI , gQ, gL, τ) = Pr{T ≤ τ |U0 = v, F I0 = gI , F
Q
0 = gQ, F
L
0 = gL}, τ ∈ Z∗, (4.13)
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where Z∗ = {0, 1, 2, ..} and T = inf{t|Ut < 0} is a ruin time which defined as the first time
when the surplus level drops below 0. In practice, τ represents the planning horizon of the
insurance company. Typically, for non-life insurance, the managers set τ equal to four or
five years (Burnecki et al., 2005).
To calculate the finite-time ruin probability, we will follow the idea of Cossette et al.
(2006) and Kim and Drekic (2016) by calculating the conditional survival probability of the
first claim occurrence recursively. We define σ(u, fI , fQ, fL, n,m) as the finite-time survival
probability until time n given that the initial level of surplus, investment fund, qard-hasan
facility, and liability level are u, fI , fQ and fL respectively, and the elapsed time M0 since
the most recent claim occurrence is m:
σ(u, fI , fQ, fL, n,m) = Pr{T > n|U0 = u, F I0 = fI , F
Q
0 = fQ, F
L
0 = fL,M0 = m}. (4.14)
Then, the finite-time ruin probability (4.13) can be represented as:
Ψ(v, gI , gQ, gL, τ) = 1− σ(v, gI , gQ, gL, τ, 0). (4.15)
In Section 4.3.3 we develop a recursive formula for the finite-time survival probability.
For this, we construct some auxiliary variables, namely the maximum value of the fund
processes in Section 4.3.1 and a calling point in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1 The Maximum Value of Funds Process
The surplus fund in Equation (4.8) is a stochastic function that the value might be de-
creasing or increasing depending on the claim payments. In this section we construct
a formula to calculate the maximum value of the surplus fund Û(t,u), investment fund
F̂ I(t,u,fI), qard-hasan fund F̂
Q
(t,fQ)
, and liability level F̂L(t,fL) representing levels of funds under
the assumption of no claim, no withdrawal, no qard-hasan undertaking, and no qard-hasan
repayment at time t given that the initial levels of U0 = u, F
I
0 = fI , F
Q
0 = fQ, F
L
0 = fL.
We should notice that Û(t,u) and F̂
L
(t,fL)
are non-decreasing functions of t, while F̂ I(t,u,fI) and
F̂Q(t,fQ) are non-decreasing functions of t if the investment returns are always positive. In our
model, we use two different assumptions of investment return, the first one is a constant
positive rate of return, and the second one is a stochastic return. The first assumption is
similar with the one developed by Kim and Drekic (2016) and Achlak (2016).
To construct a formula to calculate the maximum value of surplus process Û(t,u) and the
maximum value of the investment return F̂ I (t,u,fI), we need to identify the time points when
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the surplus level reaches the threshold levels lW and lI with the assumption of no claim,
no withdrawal, and no qard-hasan undertaking and repayment. Under these assumptions,
the surplus fund grows with a constant increase of b (i.e., the contribution payment) from
time 0 until the surplus level reaches the threshold level lI . From the time point when the
surplus level reaches lI until it reaches lD, the surplus fund grows with a constant increase
of b− d due to deposit payment to the investment fund. Denote by zI(u) and zD(u) the time




0, if u ≥ lI
d lI−u
b











(u) if u < l
D.
(4.17)
where dxe represents the least integer greater than or equal to x.
The Maximum Value of Surplus Fund
Under the assumption of no claim, no withdrawal, no borrowing, and no loan repayment,











By using the definition of premium Pt (Equation (4.1)), dividend payout to shareholders
DSt (Equation (4.2)), deposit D
I
t (Equation (4.3)), and the time points when the surplus
level reaches the threshold level lW and lI (i.e Equations (4.16) and (4.17)), it is easy to
find the maximum value of surplus fund Û(t,u) as
Û(t,u) = u+ bt− d(t− zI(u))+ − δ(t− zD(u))+, t ∈ Z+ (4.19)
if we consider a constant dividend δ1t = δ ∈ Z+, or
Û(t,u) =
{
u+ bt− d(t− zI(u))+ if t ≤ zD(u)
lD + b− d if t > zD(u)
(4.20)
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if we consider dividend as δ2t = Ut − lD with x+ = max{x, 0}.
Equations (4.19) and (4.20) can be explained as the total cash inflow and outflow to
the surplus fund. Before the time point t = zI(u), there is only regular cash inflow, which is
the constant contribution (tabaru) of b. Between zI(u) and z
D
(u), there is a regular outflow
from the surplus process (Û(t,u)) to the investment fund (F̂
I
(t,u,fI)
), which is the deposit of
d, in addition to the regular contribution payment. When the surplus reaches level lD at
zD(u), the dividend of δ
i
t, i = {1, 2} will be distributed to the participants and shareholders.
In addition to that, the surplus fund Û(t,u) will receive the contribution of b minus deposit
d afterwards.
The Maximum Value of External Funds with Non-Risky Investment Return
In this section we assume that the operator, as a fund manager, invests the investment
fund in the shariah (permissible) non-risky asset like sukuk (Islamic bond) with a constant
rate of return k1 ≥ 0. We also assume that the un-drawn down qard-hasan fund will be
invested at a constant investment gain of k2 ≥ 0. The un-drawn down qard-hasan and
those investment gains will remain in the qard-hasan fund to strengthen the qard-hasan
facility. It is noted that there is no interest in the undertaking loan from the qard-hasan
account.
The initial value of the investment fund F̂ I(t,u,fI) will grow from its initial value fI at
the rate of k1 due to investment activities. In addition to this, the investment fund will
be increased by deposit d, regularly from zI(u) until time t. In each period, y percentage of
the investment gain will be shared to the operator as the Mudharabah fee. Therefore, the
non-recursive form of the investment fund is given by









where bxc is a floor function of x represents the greatest integer less than or equal to x ,
and
k′1 = (1− y)k1 (4.22)
denoting the investment gain after deducting the Mudharabah fee. The total future value
of deposits made at times zI+(u) up to time t− 1 with respect to the investment gain k′1 will











= d(1 + k′1) + d(1 + k
′
1)





















, if zI(u) ≤ t.
(4.23)
With the assumption of no qard-hasan undertaking and no qard-hasan repayment, there
is no cash inflow or outflow except investment gains at the rate of k2:
F̂Q(t,fQ) = bfQ(1 + k2)
tc. (4.24)
The investment fund and qard-hasan fund may take non-integer values due to interest
accumulation. However, we apply the floor function in the Equation (4.21) and (4.24) to
round down the value as we assume that all Funds are in the discrete monetary account.
Taking the lower bound value of the investment and qard-hasan funds can be seen as a
conservative approach.
The liability level under the assumption of no loan undertaking and repayment will
remain the same as the initial liability level:
F̂L(t,fL) = fL (4.25)
for t ∈ Z∗.
The Maximum Values of External Funds with Risky Investment Return
In this section we assume that the investment return is not constant. The Takaful operator
invests the funds (investment and qard-hasan) in the same risky asset, for example, in the
Shariah compliance stock or floating Sukuk (Islamic bond). In our study, we model the
asset price in discrete time by a Markov chain that satisfies the recursive form Sn+1 =













To calculate the maximum value of investment fund (F̂ I (t,u,fI)), we need to add the
deposits and share the y part of Mudharabah fee. If the investment generates a positive
return, then we need to share y part of the return with Takaful operator. Notice that the
rate of return in the market model (4.26) is Si−Si−1
Si−1
= Yi − 1. Then the real rate of return
on the investment fund is: (1− y)(Yi− 1) = (Yi− yYi + y)− 1 = Y ∗i − 1, where we assume
that Yi > 1. Thus, the rate of return for is Y
∗ − 1 with Y ∗ is defined as:
Y ∗i =
{
Yi, if Yi ≤ 1,
Yi − yYi + y, if Yi > 1.
(4.28)
Therefore, the maximum value of the investment fund (F̂ I (t,u,fI)) with initial value fI and
deposit d is










Y ∗i . (4.29)
If we assume that {Yi} has a distribution P (Y = ju) = p, P (Y = jd) = 1− p, then the




jdSn, with probability1− p.
Under this model, in each time period, the asset price will go up by a constant factor of
ju with probability p, or go down by a constant factor of jd with probability 1 − p, with
ju ≥ 1 ≥ jd ≥ 0. At the time n, there are 2n possible state prices. This model is known
in mathematical finance as a binomial market model. In insurance, binomial models have
been applied to the problem of pricing of equity linked products (see, for example, Costabile
et al. (2008); Costabile (2018)). One example of the most popular binomial market model
is the one by Cox et al. (1979). In this model, the magnitude of the upward jump is
ju = e
√
σ2 , while the magnitude of the down-ward jump is jd = 1/ju, and the probability
of jump-up under risk-neutral probability measure is p = 1+r−j
d
ju−jd , where σ
2 is the asset’s
variance and r is a fixed risk-free return.
Under the assumption of the binomial price model, we can calculate the maximum
values of the external funds via the following algorithms. We define the maximum value
of the investment fund at time t for state price l as
F̂ I(t,u,f1,l) = bFI(t, u, fI , l)c, l = 1, ..., 2t, (4.30)
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where FI(t, u, fI , l) can be calculated recursively by
FI(t, u, fI , l) =

fI , if t = 0,
FI(t− 1, u, fI , dl/2e)(ju − yju + y), if 0 < t ≤ zI(u), l = {1, 3, 5, .., Nl(t)− 1},
FI(t− 1, u, fI , l/2)jd, if 0 < t ≤ zI(u), l = {2, 4, 6, .., Nl(t)},
(FI(t− 1, u, fI , dl/2e) + d)(ju − yju + y), if t > zI(u), l = {1, 3, 5, .., Nl(t)− 1},
(FI(t− 1, u, fI , l/2) + d)jd, if t > zI(u), l = {2, 4, 6, .., Nl(t)}
(4.31)
with Nl(t) represents number of state price at time t, which equals to 2
t for Binomial
model. Before the surplus reaches the dividend trigger level lI at zI(u), the investment fund
grows at a rate of return of Y ∗−1 (see Equation (4.28)). Starting from zI(u), the investment
fund receives a deposit d from the surplus fund, and it is also invested at the same rate
of return Y ∗. The state price l ∈ {1, 3, 5, .., Nl(t) − 1} represents the upward movements,
while the state price l ∈ {2, 4, 6, .., Nl(t)} represents the down-ward movements.
The maximum value of qard-hasan fund at time t for state price l as
FQ(t,fQ,l) = bFQ(t, fQ, l)c, l = 1, .., Nl(t) (4.32)
where fQ(t, fQ, l]) can be calculated recursively by
FQ(t, fQ, l) =

fQ, if t = 0,
FQ(t− 1, fQ, dl/2e)ju, if t > 0, l = {1, 3, 5, .., Nl(t)− 1},
FQ(t− 1, fQ, l/2)jd, if t > 0, l = {2, 4, 6, .., Nl(t)}.
(4.33)
The investment fund grows at a rate of return Y − 1 with a constant upward magnitude
ju and downward magnitude jd.
If by P (t, l) we denote the probability of the state price l at time t, then these proba-
bilities can be calculated recursively by
P (t, l) =

1, if t = 0,
P (t− 1, dl/2e)p, if t > 0, l = {1, 3, 5, .., Nl(t)− 1},
P (t− 1, l/2)(1− p), if t > 0, l = {2, 4, 6, .., Nl(t)}.
(4.34)
In each period of time, the probability that the asset price will go up is p, while the
probability that the asset will go down is 1− p.
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4.3.2 Calling Point
In this subsection we define a calling point, denoted by c(t,m,u,fL), which represents the
earliest time point before time t when the debt from qard-hasan facility needs to be repaid
before the first claim occurs. If the elapsed waiting time at time 0 since the most recent
claim occurrence is m, and the upper bound for the the interclaim times is na (see Equa-
tion (4.9)), then the next claim will occur before time na −m. Therefore the calling point
c(t,m,u,fL) is bounded by min{na−m, t}. Qard-hasan repayment will be paid if participants
have positive liability, and the surplus fund is greater than lW . Note that the surplus and







min{na −m, t}, if (Û(i,u) ≤ lW orF̂L(i,fL) < 0) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...,min{na −m, t}}
min{i ∈ {1, 2, ...,min{na −m, t}}|Û(i,u) > lW}, otherwise.
(4.35)
In Equation (4.35), the earliest time point to make a loan repayment is the earliest
time the liability level F̂L(i,fL) becomes positive and the surplus value Û(i,u) is greater than
lW for i = 1, 2...,min{na −m, t}.
4.3.3 Recursive Formula to Calculate the Finite-Time Survival
Probability
The aim of this subsection is to develop the algorithm to calculate the finite-time survival
probability in Equation (4.14). Once we find this value, our goal of finding the ruin
probability can be achieved by using Equation (4.15). Under the condition of no external
funds scenario, Cossette et al. (2006) propose a recursive algorithm to calculate the finite
time survival probabilities as the sum of conditional finite time survival probabilities of the
first claim occurring. Let us denote by σC(u, n) and σC(u, n, k), respectively, the finite-
time survival probability and the finite time conditional survival probability given that the


















σC(u, n, k) in Equation (4.36) is equal to 1 for k > n, because the claim occurrence after
time n implies that the process survives until n. Under the absence of investment activity
(d = 0) and no dividend payment (δit = 0), Cossette et al. (2006) define σ
C(u, n, k), k ∈
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{1, 2, .., n} as the accumulation of weighted sum of σC(u + bk − j, n − k), which is the
probability of surviving the time interval (k, n] with the level of surplus fund at time k
after the claim payment is u + bk − j, for all possible values of claim severity j that does








C(u+ bk − j, n− k) + Ak. (4.37)
By following the idea of Kim and Drekic (2016) that expanding the recursive formula
(4.37) with the existence of external funds, the finite time survival probability (4.14) can
be found using the recursive algorithm in Theorem 4.3.1.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let σ(u, fI , fQ, fL, n,m) is the finite time survival probability at time n,
with the initial values of surplus fund, investment fund, qard-hasan fund, and liability level
are u, fI , fQ and fL, respectively, and the elapsed time at time 0 since the most recent claim
occurrence is m as defined in Equation (4.14). Then σ(u, fI , fQ, fL, n,m) can be calculated
recursively using Equation (4.38)































L, n− c(n,m,u,fL), c(n,m,u,fL) +m),
(4.38)
with boundary condition
σ(u, fI , fQ, fL, n,m) =
{
0, if u ∈ Z−or m = na,
1, if u ∈ Z∗, n = 0, and m = 0, 1, ..., na − 1,
(4.39)




L(l) can be found in Theorem 4.3.2, while u





be found in Theorem 4.3.3. In the case of investment in a non-risky asset, then we set
Nl(k) = 1, P (k, l) = 1, F̂
I
(k,u,fI ,l)









L(l) be the initial levels for the next
recursive in Equation (4.38), represents level of U, F I , FQ, and FL, respectively, corre-
sponding to state price l ∈ {1, 2, .., Nl(k)} after the claim payment of X1 = j at time
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k ∈ {1, 2, .., c(n,m,u,fL)}. Then u∗(l), f ∗I (l), f ∗Q(l), and f ∗L(l) can be calculated using the fol-
lowing equations:
u∗(l) = min{max{Û(k,u) − j − F̂L(k,fL) , l




f ∗I (l) = min{max{F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l) − l
W + Û(k,u) − j , 0} , F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l)}, (4.41)
f ∗Q(l) = min{max{min{F̂
Q
(k,fQ,l)
+ F̂L(k,fL) , F̂
Q
(k,fQ,l)
+ Û(k,u) − j − lW} , F̂Q(k,fQ,l)} ,
max{F̂Q(k,fQ,l) + Û(k,u) − j − l
W + F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l) , 0}}
(4.42)
f ∗L = max{min{max{0 , F̂L(k,fL) − Û(k,u) + j + l




, F̂L(k,fL) + l
W − Û(k,u) + j − F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l)}}.
(4.43)




L(l) be the initial levels for the next
recursive in Equation (4.38), represents level of U, F I , FQ, and FL, respectively, corre-
sponding to state price l ∈ {1, 2, .., Nl(k)} after qard-hasan repayment at time c(n,m,u,fL).




L(l) can be calculated using the following equations:









f ′Q(l) = F̂
Q
(c(n,m,u,fL),fQ,l)














In this section, we implement the algorithm in section 4.3 to calculate the finite-time ruin
probabilities based on the proposed Hybrid Takaful model (i.e. Equation (4.15)) through
recursive formula (4.38). The objective is to study the effect some of the parameters may
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have on ruin probability and to investigate the performance of the Takaful proposed model
in comparison with the conventional one. We use Wolfram-Mathematica version 9.0 to do
all numerical calculations.
In our simulation study, we apply the set of input parameters as in Kim and Drekic
(2016) and Achlak (2016), which will facilitate comparisons between the existing models
and the proposed model. We assume that the interclaim time follows a truncated geometric
distribution with na = 25:
ak =
{
(2/11)(9/11)(k − 1) if k = 1, 2, ..., 24,
(9/11)24 if k = 25,
while the claim size distribution follows a discretized version of Pareto distribution with
mean 10.5 and variance 120
αj(k) = αj = (1 +
j − 1
30
)−4 − (1 + j
30
)−4, j ∈ Z+. (4.48)
In all of the simulations, we set the contribution b = 5, the initial value for the partic-
ipants’ fund v = 10, the initial value of the investment fund gI = 0, and the initial value
of liability gL = 0. All of these values are in the currency unit, for example, in million of
dollars. In addition to that, we assume that the rate of return for the investment fund (k1)
is 1% per month.
Figure (4.6) shows ruin probabilities with time horizon τ = 25, and trigger points
lW = 0, lI = 20, and lD = 50. We assume a constant dividend δ1t = δ = 3, a deposit d = 1,
and an investment rate of return for qard-hasan fund k2 = 0.02. We calculate ruin time
probabilities for several values of the maximum loan capacity gQ. In our Takaful model,
we need the percentage of Mudharabah fee (y), while in the conventional model, this fee
is zero. We consider two different values of y, namely 0 and 50%.
For the surplus and investment fund, our proposed model has similar features as the
conventional counterpart proposed by Kim and Drekic (2016). Hence, under the assump-
tion of no loan facility and no Mudharabah fee, gQ = 0 and y = 0, the ruin probabilities
of our proposed Takaful model are the same as in the the conventional one in Kim and
Drekic (2016). The difference between our model and Kim and Drekic (2016) model is
in the features of the loan activities. In the conventional model, there is an interest rate
charged in each loan. In addition to that, the borrower is forced to repay the loan if the
loan undertaking (including the accumulative interest rate) exceeds the maximum loan
capacity. This rule may cause the ruin to occur. The qard-hasan facility in our pro-
posed Takaful model has two benefits; the loan capacity may positively grow as a result
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of investing the undrawn-down qard-hasan, and the loan will be repaid if there is enough
money in the surplus fund. We may see from Figure (4.6) that the ruin probabilities of
our proposed Takaful model with Mudharabah fee y = 0 or y = 0.5 are lower than the
conventional counterpart. Moreover, the higher loan capacity produces a greater difference
in ruin probabilities between the proposed Takaful model and the conventional one. The
two different values of the Mudharabah fee that we have chosen in our implementation do
not produce significantly different ruin probabilities.
Figure 4.6: Finite time ruin probabilities of the conventional and the proposed Takaful
models for several values of maximum loan capacity 0 ≤ gQ ≤ 16
Figure (4.7) compares the Takaful ruin time probabilities based on the proposed model
with probabilities based on the model proposed by Achlak (2016). In the Achlak (2016)
model, the qard-hasan fund is not invested, and there is no obligation for the participants
to return the qard-hasan undertaking. We apply the same dividend value δ2t = Ut− lD with
several values of the initial qard-hasan fund, gQ. Other input parameters are the same as
the input parameters that we use in the previous simulation.
We also set 3 different values of the rate of return for qard-hasan fund (k2 ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.02}).
In the case of no qard-hasan facility, we obtain the same ruin probabilities as that based
on the Achlak (2016) model for all values of k2. This is because the surplus and invest-
ment features in our proposed model are the same to the ones in Achlak (2016). For
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gQ > 0, when the qard-hasan fund is not invested (k2 = 0), the qard-hasan repayment in
our proposed model causes the ruin probability to be slightly higher than the one without
loan repayment. This result is due to the loan repayment, causing a delay in depositing
the investment fund. However, if we invest in the qard-hasan fund, the obligation of loan
repayment leads to lower ruin probabilities than those without loan repayment. The dif-
ference between finite-time ruin probabilities with and without loan repayment becomes
more visible when the initial qard-hasan fund (gQ) increases.
Figure 4.7: Finite time ruin probabilities with lW = 0, lI = 20, lD = 50, y = 0.5 ,
δt = Ut − lD and k2 = 0 for Ψ[10, 0, gQ, 0, 25]1, k2 = 0.01 for Ψ[10, 0, gQ, 0, 25]2, and
k2 = 0.02 for Ψ[10, 0, gQ, 0, 25]
3
Figure (4.8) represents finite-time ruin probabilities at τ = 12 corresponding to time
horizon τ = 12 with trigger points lW = 0, 0 ≤ lI ≤ 50, lD = 50, initial qard-hasan
fund gQ = 10, Mudharabah fee y = 5%, deposit d = 1, and dividend δ = 3. We consider
four different assumptions about the asset’s return: the first one is a non risky asset with
the rate of return of 1% per month. The other three are risky with the expected rate of
return of 1% per month and variance 0.0001, 0.001, and 0.01. In this simulation we apply
CRR model as explained in Chapter 4.3.1. The graph suggests that the finite-time ruin
probabilities increase as the variance of the asset is increased. In addition to that we may
see that the finite-time ruin probabilities for non risky assets (σ2 = 0) and risky assets
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with low variance (σ2 = 0.0001) increase as we increase the investment trigger level lI .
This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that when lI increases then deposits in
investment activities will be delayed. This, in turn, reduces the probability of ruin, since
positive returns earned only from the investment activities in the external funds. However,
the explanation does not apply to the case of investing in the risky asset with high volatility.
It can be explained by the fact that investing in risky assets may produce negative returns
on the investment fund that reduce the total reserve of Takaful fund. The higher volatility
of the asset price will add the riskiness of the Takaful product. Hence, the higher volatility
of the asset’s return produces a higher ruin probability. For both σ2 = 0.001 and 0.01, the
optimal level to invest is lI = 45, when using ruin probability as a criterion.
Figure 4.8: Finite time ruin probabilities corresponding to the interclaim time distribution
(c) with lW = 0, 0 ≤ lI ≤ 45, lD = 50, y = 0.05 , δt = 3, d = 1, k1 = 0.01, k2 = 0.02,
v = 10, gI = 0, gQ = 10, gL = 0, and τ = 15
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a framework of Hybrid-Takaful that incorporates in-
vestment activities and qard-hasan facility. Qard-hasan (benevolent loan) facility is the
non-interest loan provided by shareholders to Takaful participants in the case of a deficit.
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We assume that the qard-hasan undertaking will be returned if the participants’ fund gains
surplus in the future. We construct a surplus process of the participants’ fund, and then
derive a method of calculating finite-time ruin probabilities.
Based on our numerical simulations, we find that the qard-hasan facility improves the
performance of the fund, as it decreases the finite-time ruin probabilities. This can be
explained by the fact that this facility, unlike in the conventional insurance, provides loans
at no cost and no mandatory repayment when there is a deficit. In addition, paying off
the qard-hasan undertaking not only follows the Shariah rule but also has a positive effect
on the business, if we invest the undrawn-down qard-hasan in non-risky assets. By paying
off the loan undertaking to the qard-hasan fund, we can guarantee that the fund will grow
at the corresponding rate of return. If the fund remains in the surplus account, then the
investment return is delayed until the surplus account reaches the investment trigger level.
Our study incorporates the option to invest the investment fund and qard-hasan fund in
the same risky asset under the assumption of binomial CRR market model.
In theory, we can approximate the infinite-time ruin probability by calculating the
finite-time ruin probability with time horizon τ −→∞. However, in practice this approach
is expensive in terms of the numerical computations due to the recursive calculations.
To overcome this problem, the simulation based method can be one possible approach to
calculate the infinite-time ruin probability which is the future work of this research.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks and Future
Works
This thesis presents a mathematical approach to quantify the risk associated with Islamic
finance and insurance. In particular, we propose a Shariah-compliant portfolio model for
single and multiperiod time settings, and a computational framework to calculate finite-
time ruin probability in a Takaful product. This chapter provides some concluding remarks
and possible future research topics for each component of this thesis.
5.1 A Single Period Markowitz-based Shariah Com-
pliant Portfolio Model
In Chapter 2 we have proposed a Shariah-compliant portfolio optimization problem with a
new purification model, which is more consistent with current practice than other existing
models. We also have incorporated the importance of non-compliance probabilistic screen-
ing constraints, which are overlooked in the existing literature. We found that the proposed
constraints are effective in maintaining the sustainability of the Shariah-compliance port-
folio. However, our current model can not capture the cost incurred by the compliance
change due to the screening process. Also, our study focuses on model construction and
applies optimization software to solve the problem. Hence, several future works can be
done to extend the research:
• Study the possible costs incurred due to changes in compliance status and include
these variables into the Shariah portfolio model.
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• Study the possibility to derive an analytical solution to solve the proposed Shariah
portfolio problem. If the analytical solution can not be achieved, proposing a numer-
ical approach to solve the Shariah portfolio problem is another interesting topic.
• In the current model, we use mean and variance to measure the risk of a portfo-
lio. Considering other risk measure models can be an interesting topic in a Shariah
compliance portfolio.
5.2 Multiperiod Mean-Variance Shariah Compliant Port-
folio
In Chapter 3, we have extended the Shariah-compliant portfolio model with the purifica-
tion and screening process in the multiperiod setting. The effectiveness of the proposed
screening constraints is seen more profound in the case of the multiperiod Shariah portfolio
problem. We found that the chosen assumption of the financial ratios model is sensitive to
the Shariah portfolio efficient frontier. In the current numerical example, we only consider
beta distribution and the Beta-AR(1) model to capture the temporal dynamics of financial
screening ratios. We apply a pre-commitment strategy with a geometric Brownian motion
model to solve the problem and overlook the time consistency issue. Several important
future works can be done to improve the research:
• Conduct an indepth study to determine the best stochastic model to capture financial
screening ratios.
• Impose time consistency constraint as proposed by Cong and Oosterlee (2017a) to
the Shariah portfolio model to guarantee the time consistency condition.
5.3 Discrete Time Ruin Probability for Takaful (Is-
lamic Insurance) with Investment and Qard-Hasan
(Benevolent Loan) Activities
In Chapter 4, we have constructed a framework of Hybrid-Takaful that incorporates investment-
based mudarabah (profit-sharing) activities and qard-hasan (benevolent loan) facility. In
this study, we use ruin probability to quantify the risk associated with Takaful business.
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We found that paying off the qard-hasan undertaking follows the Shariah rule and posi-
tively affects the business if we invest in the undrawn-down qard-hasan. In the current
model, we consider the investment portfolio consists of 1 risk-free asset and 1 risky asset
under the assumption of the binomial CRR model. There are several future interesting
topics in Takaful model, including:
• Extend the model to invest in several risky assets for the investment fund and qard-
hasan fund. For this case, we may follow the idea of Moon et al. (2008), who con-
structed the binomial state price for two dependent assets.
• Derive formula to compute the expected total discounted dividend payments from
underwriting surplus, expected total mudarabah, and expected total wakalah fee for
our proposed Hybrid Takaful model can be an alternative method to measure the
performance of Takaful product. The recursive formula for dividend payments might
have a faster convergence than the ruin probability calculation due to the discount
factor as shown in Kim and Drekic (2016).
• Consider a simulation based approach to calculate a infinite time ruin probability.
• Conduct research on the optimal decision problem for Takaful products, including
the study on the investment and dividend payment strategies.
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Appendix A
Descriptive Statistics of Data Used in Section 2.3
TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
Mean 0.058605 0.059019 0.018663 0.066473 0.077166 0.096709
Variance 0.0211 0.016059 0.033481 0.066605 0.042362 0.052475
Std Dev 0.145259 0.126724 0.182977 0.25808 0.205821 0.229073
Skewness 0.647027 0.637435 0.752749 0.694834 0.417666 1.830642
Excess Kurtosis 1.109213 0.192871 1.514068 0.261214 0.313865 4.408252
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of quarterly stock return data
TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
Mean 0.069998 0.008359 0.009998 0.006350 0.006485 0.022681
Variance 0.006406 0.000014 0.000058 0.000016 0.000017 0.001222
Std Dev 0.080039 0.003795 0.007613 0.004058 0.004136 0.034957
Skewness 1.005547 0.022057 1.358758 1.38922 1.170942 0.617968
Excess Kurtosis -0.642802 -1.830258 0.09621 0.240012 -0.489147 -1.102855
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of quarterly dividend yield data
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TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
Mean 0.000158 0.000007 0.000691 0.000616 0.000188 0.007378
Variance 0.000000 0.000000 0.000002 0.000002 0.000000 0.000068
Std Dev 0.000246 0.000008 0.001479 0.001335 0.000347 0.008234
Skewness 1.235055 0.588716 2.434840 2.180649 1.452787 0.538026
Excess Kurtosis 0.343202 -1.104242 5.430587 3.349179 0.400690 -1.167754
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of quarterly dividend purification rate data
TLKM UNVR PGAS WIKA KLBF ASII
Mean 0.002844 0.000021 0.002483 0.005245 0.000821 0.039644
Variance 0.000002 0.000000 0.000002 0.000024 0.000000 0.000450
Std Dev 0.001392 0.000018 0.001564 0.004853 0.000471 0.021224
Skewness 0.407361 1.247295 0.984013 1.220263 0.477745 0.398915
Excess Kurtosis -0.846496 0.924108 0.627371 -0.069929 -1.072433 -0.919287
Table A.4: Descriptive statistics of quarterly investment purification rate data
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Appendix B
Histograms and QQ-Plots of Financial Ratios Data
B.1 Histograms of Financial Ratios Data
Figure B.1: Histograms TLKM Financial Ratios
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Figure B.2: Histograms UNVR Financial Ratios
Figure B.3: Histograms PGAS Financial Ratios
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Figure B.4: Histograms WIKAFinancial Ratios
Figure B.5: Histograms KLBF Financial Ratios
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Figure B.6: Histograms ASII Financial Ratio
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B.2 QQ-Plots of Financial Ratios Data
Figure B.7: qqPlots TLKM Financial Ratios
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Figure B.8: qqPlots ASII Financial Ratiso
Figure B.9: qqPlots PGAS Financial Ratios
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Figure B.10: qqPlots WIKA Financial Ratios
Figure B.11: qqPlots KLBF Financial Ratios
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Figure B.12: qqPlots UNVR Financial Ratios
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Appendix C
Data and Statistical Analysis Discussed in Section 3.3
C.1 Statistical Evidence of Returns Data
Figure C.1: Histograms of Return and Purified returns ASII
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Figure C.2: QQ-Plots of Return and Purified returns ASII
Figure C.3: Histograms of Return and Purified returns TLKM
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Figure C.4: QQ-Plots of Return and Purified returns TLKM
C.2 Algorithm to Estimate Beta-AR(1) Parameters
The conditional mean and variance of financial ratio Fji,t, respectively, are:

















Then, we can estimate the Beta-AR(1) parameters by using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1: The calculation of Beta-AR(1) parameters
Input: Historical time series data of financial ratio




for k ← 2 to m do


























C.3 Description of the Diagnostic Test
Under the Beta-AR(1) model, the predicted financial ratio follows:











with yji,t, t = 1, . . . ,m being the actual value.
After obtaining the estimated coefficients αAji, β
A1








C.3.1 Plots of the Standardized Residuals
(a) Leverage ratio (b) Cash ratio
(c) Liquidity ratio (d) NPI ratio
Figure C.5: Standardized residuals from Beta-AR(1) model for ASII financial ratios
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(a) Leverage ratio (b) Cash ratio
(c) Liquidity ratio
Figure C.6: Standardized residuals from Beta-AR(1) model for TLKM financial ratios
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C.3.2 Autocorrelation of the Standardized Residuals
(a) Leverage ratio (b) Cash ratio
(c) Liquidity ratio (d) NPI ratio
Figure C.7: Sample autocorrelation functions of the standardized residuals from Beta-
AR(1) model for ASII financial ratios
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(a) Leverage ratio (b) Cash ratio
(c) Liquidity ratio
Figure C.8: Sample autocorrelation functions of the standardized residuals from Beta-
AR(1) model for TLKM financial ratios
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Appendix D
List of Symbols Used in Chapter 4
Symbol Description
ak, k = {1, .., na} probability mass function (pmf) of Wi
Ak, k ∈ {1, .., na} survival function of Wi
b contribution
c(t,m,u,fL) calling point for time horizon t with initial values m,u, fL, and M0 = m
d deposit
fs, s ∈ {I,Q, L} initial value of F s
f ∗s (l), s ∈ {I,Q, L} updated initial value of F s, s ∈ {I,Q, L} after claim payment
f ′s(l), s ∈ {I,Q, L} updated initial value of F s after qard-hasan repayment
F I Investment fund
F̂ I(t,u,fI ,l) Maximum value of F
I at time t with initial values u, fI for asset price l
FL Libaility fund
F̂L(t,fL) Maximum value of F
L at time t with initial values fL
F̂Q(t,fQ,l) Maximum value of F
Q at time t with initial values fQ, and asset price l
F st , s ∈ {I,Q, L} Level of F s at the end of period (t− 1, t]
F st−, s ∈ {I,Q, L} Level of F s after claim payment, before withdraw and borrowing corre-
sponding to time interval (t-1,t]
jd magnitude of asset price down-ward movement
ju magnitude of asset price upward movement
k1 investment gain of F
I under assumption risk-free asset
k′1 real investment gain of F
I
k1 investment gain of F
Q under assumption risk-free asset
lD trigger level for dividend payment
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lI trigger level for investment activities
lW minimal requirement of surplus fund
M0 elapsed waiting time since the most recent claim occurrence
na upper bound of Wi
Nl(t) number of asset state prices at time t
p probability of asset price upward movement
P (t, l) probability of the state price l at time t
T ruin time
u initial value of U
u∗ updated initial value of U after claim payment
u′ updated initial value of U after qard-hasan repayment
U Surplus fund
Ut Level of U at the end of period (t− 1, t]
Ut− Level of U after claim payment, before withdraw and borrowing corre-
sponding to time interval (t− 1, t]
Û(t,u) Maximum value of U at time t with initial value u
Wi time between claims (i− 1) and i
Xi i-th claim’s severity
y percentage of Mudharabah fee
zI(u) the earliest time U with initial value u reaches lI
zD(u) the earliest time U with initial value u reaches lD
αj(k) conditional pmf of Xi given Wi = k
δ1t a constant dividend
δ2t excess surplus dividend
Ψ(u, fI , fQ, fL, τ) finite-time ruin probability with values u, fI , fQ, fL, τ
σ2 variance of asset price rate of return
σ(u, fI , fQ, fL, n,m) finite-time survival probability with τ = n,M0 = m, and initial values
u, fI , fQ, fL
τ time horizon of the finite-time ruin/survival probability
x+ max{x, 0}
Table D.1: List of Symbols
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Appendix E
The proofs of Theorems in Chapter 4
E.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3.1
Proof. By incorporating debt fund scenario (i.e qard-hasan facility in Takaful), there is
possibility to make a loan repayment before the first claim occurs. Hence, we need to
reset the recursive calculation (4.37) at the time the qard-hasan repayment is made (i.e.,
at the calling point c(n,m,u,fL)). In practice we need to consider two cases when calculating
σ(u, fI , fQ, fL, n,m), which correspond to the first claim occurring either before the calling
point cn,m,u,f or after this point. While in the first case the calculations are similar to those
in (4.37). But, the pmf of the interclaim time is now conditional on the value of m. While,
in the second case the calculations need a different approach. From the explanation above,
we get





Pr{T > n|U0 = u, F I0 = fI , F
Q
0 = fQ,
FL0 = fL,M0 = m,W1(m) = k}+
Ac(n,m,u,fL)
Am
Pr{T > n|U0 = u, F I0 = fI ,
FQ0 = fQ, F
L
0 = fL,M0 = m,W1(m) > c(n,m,u,fL)}.
(E.1)
The probabilities in the right hand side of Equation (E.1) represents the probabilities that
the ruin does not occur until time point n, given that the first claim X1 takes place at time
W1(m) = k, where W1(m) is the duration from the initial time point until the first claim
occurring given that the elapsed waiting time since the most recent claim is m. Next,
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our objective is to prove that the right-hand side of Equation (E.1) is the same as the
right-hand side of Equation (4.38). In particular, we will prove the following equations:
Pr{T > n|U0 = u, F I0 = fI , F
Q
0 = fQ, F
L















L(l), n− k, 0), k ∈ {1, 2, .., c(n,m,u,fL)},
(E.2)
and
Pr{T > n|U0 = u, F I0 = fI , F
Q
0 = fQ, F
L








L, n− c(n,m,u,fL), c(n,m,u,fL) +m).
(E.3)
To prove Equation (E.2) we use similar approach as in Cossette et al. (2006). The
conditional survival probability given the first claim occur at time k ∈ {1, 2, .., c(n,m,u,fL)}




L, n − k, 0), which is the probability of surviving the
time interval (k, n] with the level of funds’ process at time k after the claim payment is




L, for all possible values of claim severity j that does not cause ruin. The
maximum value of claim severity is bounded above by the amount of total available fund
in the surplus fund, investment fund, and qard-hasan fund at time k before the first claim
payment. This value is equal to Û(k,u) + F̂
I
(k,u,fI ,l)
+ F̂Q(k,fQ,l), for all possible state price
l ∈ {1, 2, .., Nt(k)}. Where Ûk,u, F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l), and F̂
Q
(k,fQ,l)
are the maximum values of fund
processes that explained in Section 4.3.1. The initial surplus and external fund amounts




L, are determined by the size of contributions and the
incured claim j that can be found in Theorem 4.3.2. This explanation prove Equation (E.2).
Now, we follow the idea proposed by Kim and Drekic (2016) to prove Equation (E.3).
In situations when W1(m) > c(n,m,u,fL), we do not consider on the claim payment, instead
we consider on making the qard-hasan repayment at time c(n,m,u,fL). Since, we are not
considering the claim occurrence at time c(n,m,u,fL), for the next recursion, the elapsed
waiting time counter is increase by c(n,m,u,fL), while n is reduced by c(n,m,u,fL). The initial




L, which represents the funds’ level
after the qard-hasan repayment is made at time c(n,m,u,fL). these values can be found in
Theorem 4.3.3.
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E.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3.2




L(l) it is convenient to split
their values into 5 cases depending on the possible positions of the surplus level after a




L(l)) in the following explanation for
each cases.
• case 1: Û(k,u) − j − lW ≥ F̂L(k,fL). Since, in this case the surplus level after the claim
payment exceeds lW and is greater than the liability level, we make full qard-hasan
repayment. Therefore we have (Û(k,u) − j − F̂L(k,fL), F̂
I
(k,u,fI ,l)




• case 2: 0 ≤ Û(k,u) − j − lW < F̂L(k,fL). In this case the surplus level after the claim
payment exceeds lW but is not enough to cover all liability. Hence we make the
qard-hasan repayment equal to the difference between the surplus and the level lW .
Therefore we have (lW , F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l), F̂
Q
(k,fQ,l)
+(Û(k,u)−j− lW ), F̂L(k,fL)− (Û(k,u)−j− l
W )).
• case 3: F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l) ≥ l
W −(Û(k,u)−j) > 0. In this case the surplus level after the claim
payment is less then lW . Therefore, we need to withdraw from the investment fund




(Û(k,u) − j − lW ), F̂L(k,fL) − (Û(k,u) − j − l
W )).
• case 4: F̂Q(k,fQ,l) ≥ l
W − Û(k,u) + j − F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l) > 0. In this case the surplus level after
the claim payment is less then lW , and the investment fund is not enough to cover
the deficit of surplus fund, then we need to borrow from the qard-hasan fund to bring
the surplus value back to the level lW . Therefore we have (lW , 0, F̂Q(k,fQ,l) + Û(k,u) −
j − lW + F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l), F̂
L
(k,fL)
− (Û(k,u) − j − lW + F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l))).
• case 5: F̂Q(k,fQ,l) < l
W − Û(k,u) + j − F̂ Ik,u,fI ,l. In this case the surplus level after the
claim payment is less then lW , however both the investment and qard-hasan funds
are not enough to bring the surplus fund back to the level lW . Thus, the maximum
surplus level is equal to Û(k,u) − j + F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l) + F̂
Q
(k,fQ,l)
. As long as this value is non
negative, the recursive calculation is still running. If this value is negative then the
calculation is finished based on the boundary condition (4.39). Therefore we have
(Û(k,u) − j + F̂ I(k,u,fI ,l) + F̂
Q
(k,fQ,l)





E.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3.3
Proof. At time c(n,m,u,fL) we need to perform qard-hasan repayment by withdrawing from
the surplus fund and add to qard-hasan fund. The amount of qard-hasan that borrowed
by participants at time c(n,m,u,fL) is F̂
L
(c(n,m,u,fL),fL)
, hence this is the maximum value that
need to be repaid. However, in our model, qard-hasan repayment should not bring the
surplus level drop below lW . By this assumption the maximum value that can be paid
at time c(n,m,u,fL) is (Û(c(n,m,u,fL),u) − l
W )+. We apply function X+ = max{0, X} to make
sure the criteria of qard-hasan repayment is Û(c(n,m,u,fL),u) ≥ l
W . Therefore total amount





After the qard-hasan fund is made, total liability at time c(n,m,u,fL) is reduced. Qard-hasan
repayment did not make any change to the level of investment fund.
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